Author

Anna Obedkova

ORCID Identifier(s)

0000-0002-2079-0287

Graduation Semester and Year

2018

Language

English

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration

Department

Management

First Advisor

Parthiban David

Second Advisor

Ann McFadyen

Abstract

While the general stream of shareholder activism literature examines the antecedents and consequences of hedge fund activism, this dissertation investigates this phenomenon from a different angle. I examine the impact of time-related antecedents on the choice of campaigns initiated by hedge fund activists and the consequences of such interventions. To be specific, I study the impact of the shareholder mix, i.e. long-term (dedicated) vs. short-term (transient) ownership, and firm investment horizon on the choice of two most common hedge fund demands: governance changes and business strategy-related changes. Building on prior research, I argue that governance changes are associated with long-term consequences, while business strategy demands are associated with short-term consequences. I propose that hedge funds align the choice of demands with the interests of the majority of intuitional shareholders in the firm. Thus, hedge fund activists initiate governance campaigns in firms with the higher proportion of dedicated shareholders and business strategy demands in firms with the higher proportion of transient ownership. Moreover, I argue that, to avoid the negative consequences of firms’ overemphasizing either short- term or long-term investment horizon, hedge funds try to balance it out by initiating governance campaigns in firms that overemphasize short-term horizons and business strategy changes on firms that overemphasize long-term investment horizon (e.g. family firms). The empirical results suggest that matching the type of campaign with the interests of the shareholders is supported only for alignment of business strategy changes and higher proportion of transient shareholder ownership. Such alignment has a positive impact on cumulative abnormal returns and market value. A significant, but negative relationship was found for balancing out the overemphasize of short- or long-term firm investment horizon, which implies that hedge funds actually try to align the type of campaign with the type of overemphasis. Thus, they initiate firm governance campaigns in firms that overemphasize long-term investment horizon and business strategy changes in firms that overemphasize short-term investment horizons.

Keywords

Hedge fund activist investors, Investment horizon, Shareholder mix, Performance

Disciplines

Business | Business Administration, Management, and Operations

License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Comments

Degree granted by The University of Texas at Arlington

28315-2.zip (2240 kB)

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