Document Type
Article
Source Publication Title
Journal of Legal Analysis
First Page
375
Last Page
438
DOI
http://doi.org/10.1093/jla/law006
Abstract
The Supreme Court says that campaign finance regulations are unconstitutional unless they target “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. To test those appearances, we fielded two studies. First, in a highly realistic simulation, three grand juries deliberated on charges that a campaign spender bribed a Congressperson. Second, 1271 representative online respondents considered whether to convict, with five variables manipulated randomly. In both studies, jurors found quid pro quo corruption for behaviors they believed to be common. This research suggests that Supreme Court decisions were wrongly decided, and that Congress and the states have greater authority to regulate campaign finance. Prosecutions for bribery raise serious problems for the First Amendment, due process, and separation of powers. Safe harbors may be a solution.
Disciplines
Anthropology | Social and Behavioral Sciences | Sociology
Publication Date
5-23-2016
Language
English
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
Recommended Citation
Robertson, Christopher; Winkelman, D. Alex; Bergstrand, Kelly; and Modzelewski, Darren, "The Appearance and the Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation" (2016). Sociology & Anthropology Faculty Publications. 20.
https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/sociologyanthropology_facpubs/20