Document Type
Report
Source Publication Title
Technical Report 270
Abstract
The von Neumann-Morgenstern solution (vN-M solution) or stable set is arguably the most dynamic and flexible solution concept for cooperative games with side-payments. Perhaps the most striking phenomenon is that vN-M solutions often suggest intricate coalition formation processes and corresponding payoffs. Why this occurs is not well understood. On the other hand, vN-M solutions are difficult to find. This paper deals with the class of discriminatory vN-M solutions and presents results that give insights in the corresponding coalition formation process. A computationally effective procedure is presented to answer the decision problem whether or not a proposed set of imputations to a given game is a discriminatory vN-M solution.
Disciplines
Mathematics | Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Publication Date
5-1-1990
Language
English
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Heijmans, J. G. C., "Discriminatory Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions" (1990). Mathematics Technical Papers. 73.
https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/math_technicalpapers/73