Document Type
Report
Source Publication Title
Technical Report 256
Abstract
The bargaining sets have been introduced as solution concepts for cooperative n-person games with side payments by R. J. Aumann and M. Maschler (1964). A further study on the relationships between various concepts of solution for such games is due to R. J. Aumann and J. Dreze (1975). The Aumann/Maschler definition of a bargaining set relies upon a stability principle imposed to the payoffs in this set: an admissible payoff belongs to a bargaining set if for every objection against this payoff there is a counter objection. Two modification of the stability principle have been discussed in earlier papers of the author (Dragan,1985,1987,1988).
Disciplines
Mathematics | Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Publication Date
12-1-1988
Language
English
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Dragan, Irinel C., "The Compensatory Bargaining Set of a Cooperative N-Person Game with Side Payments" (1988). Mathematics Technical Papers. 59.
https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/math_technicalpapers/59