Document Type
Report
Source Publication Title
Technical Report 330
Abstract
A new axiomatic characterization of the semivalues of finite cooperative n-person games with transferable utilities is given, by using a potential function. The semivalues are proved to be the unique functionals on the space of such games, which are consistent relative to a Hart/Mas Colell type of reduced game and weighted standard for two person games. The potential is also used to prove the validity of a recursive definition of semivalues, as well as the fact that the semivalues are Shapley values of the so called Power Game.
Disciplines
Mathematics | Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Publication Date
1-1-1998
Language
English
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Dragan, Irinel C., "Potential and Consistency for Semivalues of Finite Cooperative TU Games" (1998). Mathematics Technical Papers. 278.
https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/math_technicalpapers/278