Document Type
Report
Source Publication Title
Technical Report 212
Abstract
A concept of bargaining set for cooperative n person games with side payments has been defined by assuming that a player could be attracted in a new coalition only if his supplementary gain exceeds a fixed threshold and could reject a new coalition only if his loss exceeds another fixed threshold. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the objections with thresholds and for the existence of the counter objections with thresholds associated to couples consisting of a group of players and a coalition structure subjected to some conditions have been proved. These results enabled us to state a combinatorial algorithm for establishing whether a given payoff configuration belongs to the bargaining set with thresholds, or not.
Disciplines
Mathematics | Physical Sciences and Mathematics
Publication Date
2-1-1984
Language
English
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 4.0 International License.
Recommended Citation
Dragan, Irinel C., "Bargaining Sets with Thresholds" (1984). Mathematics Technical Papers. 212.
https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/math_technicalpapers/212