Document Type

Report

Source Publication Title

Technical Report 280

Abstract

Projection methods of solving convex feasibility problems lead naturally to a class of bargaining scheme's for points in the core of cooperative n-person games. Each such bargaining scheme is by itself a mathematical model of "rational behavior" describing a specific way of achieving "equilibrated" payoff vectors. We show that many of these bargaining schemes are "stable"' and have meaningful heuristic interpretations.

Disciplines

Mathematics | Physical Sciences and Mathematics

Publication Date

5-1-1991

Language

English

Included in

Mathematics Commons

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