Graduation Semester and Year
Summer 2026
Document Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy in Business Administration
Department
Finance
First Advisor
Sanjiv Sabherwal
Second Advisor
David Rakowski
Third Advisor
Mohammad Riaz Uddin
Abstract
The literature on Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) characteristics and insider trading is vast. Numerous studies use various CEO characteristics such as CEO stardom to assess the predictive power of insider trades. However, several questions in this area remain unanswered. This dissertation consists of three essays that explore how CEOs' values affect the predictive power of their trades.
In the first essay, we investigate whether a Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) civic engagement affects the informativeness of his trades. Using a large sample of U.S. corporate CEOs, we find that CEO purchases are more informative about future firm performance when CEOs exhibit low civic engagement. The predictive power of such purchases is stronger for opportunistic (i.e., non-routine) trades. The evidence persists during non-crisis periods and in non-highly regulated industries. Additionally, the predictive power of purchases decreases as CEOs have longer tenures and get older.
The second essay investigates whether a Chief Executive Officer's (CEO) military background affects the informativeness of his trades. Using three different methods to identify ex-military CEOs, we find that purchases by non-military CEOs are more informative about a firm's future performance than purchases by military CEOs. The predictive power of non-military CEOs' trades is attributable to opportunistic trades, rather than routine trades. We also find that this evidence persists in industries that receive less scrutiny, in non-large firms, among CEOs who do not hold dual positions, among younger CEOs, and during periods of non-crisis.
The third essay explores whether a CEO’s religious educational background affects the informativeness of his trades. The evidence shows that trades of CEOs with a religious educational background are more informative about future firm performance compared to non-religious CEOs’ trades. CEOs with a religious educational background place more opportunistic (i.e., non-routine) trades compared to CEOs without a religious educational background. The evidence persists preceding earnings announcements, and in non-crisis periods.
Keywords
Insider trading, CEO civic engagement, firm performance, CEO opportunism, military CEO, religious.
Disciplines
Finance and Financial Management
License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Recommended Citation
Kone, Noura Khadidja, "Essays on CEO Bacground and Insider Trades." (2026). Finance and Real Estate Dissertations. 1.
https://mavmatrix.uta.edu/financerealestate_dissertations2/1