5-1-2021

SECURING INFLUENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL TENURE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Carrington Matthews

SECURING INFLUENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL TENURE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

by

CARRINGTON MATTHEWS

Presented to the Faculty of the Honors College of

The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

HONORS BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON

May 2021

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Completing this research project was one of the most challenging yet rewarding projects I have ever worked on, but without the support of many people this project would not have been possible. First, thank you to my mentor, Dr. Daniel Sledge, for guiding me throughout the process and providing me with the literature, resources, and advice I needed to bring my vision of this project to life. Second, I would like to thank Dr. Herschel Thomas for the opportunity to develop the research design proposal in which this project was based upon and for analyzing the project's findings with Dr. Sledge and me. Third, thank you to the faculty of the Honors College for giving me the incredible opportunity to complete my very own undergraduate research project and for being such a wonderful support system during my entire time as an undergraduate student. Fourth, I must thank the Department of Political Science for connecting me with amazing faculty members who helped me realize my academic potential and nurtured my passion for political science. Finally, thank you to my parents for their continuous encouragement and interest in my studies and to Tanner for his unwavering love and support.

December 01, 2020

ABSTRACT

SECURING INFLUENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONGRESSIONAL TENURE AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

Carrington Matthews, B.A. Political Science

The University of Texas at Arlington, 2020

Faculty Mentor: Daniel Sledge

Congressional members are influenced by several competing factors when they cast their vote on a bill, including party influence, their desire to win re-election, and the concerns of their constituents. The literature provides reason to believe that newer members of Congress would be more likely to vote in support of a bill sponsored by a member of their own political party so as to secure influence in their political party and Congress. This project conducted a cross-sectional secondary data analysis of the voting behavior of Congress members during five congressional sessions over a 20-year period to determine if senior members of Congress were more likely to vote against a bill sponsored by a member of their party. Findings suggest that newer members are more likely to vote against their party; this could be to distinguish themselves and ultimately gain influence in their political party and Congress.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Framers gave the U.S. Congress the powers to create legislation for the American people. They drew upon the ideas of John Locke, a noted Enlightenment philosopher, who wrote in his work *The Second Treatise of Government* that government should be comprised of representatives who create laws to serve the best interest of the people they govern (Locke 2008). This appears to be a relatively straightforward idea – representatives in Congress create legislation they believe will help their constituents in the best ways possible. Congress has evolved over the past 200 years, though its primary function to create legislation has remained the same.

Today, creating legislation is not the simple task the Constitution makes it out to be. Theoretically, Congress members should be primarily concerned with serving the interests of their constituents by representing them in federal government. However, in practice, members of Congress are required to balance a number of competing forces and interests in the creation and passage of legislation. Among these forces and interests include: the agenda of the party, the seniority system, maintaining popular support among constituents, and winning re-election. Political scientists have looked at each one of these factors in the examination of congressional voting behavior – that is, how a Congress member votes in sessions of Congress. There is extensive research on each of these topics which helps to explain the different components Congress members must consider when casting their vote on a bill.

While the existing knowledge about factors influencing congressional voting behavior is extensive, this project is going to examine another less understood factor: tenure. Few studies have researched the relationship between the amount of time a Congress member spends in office and how that Congress member votes on legislation. Since there is little existing knowledge on the relationship of tenure and congressional voting behavior, this project is vital in expanding this knowledge. This paper will examine whether or not tenure influences congressional voting behavior, and, if it does, in what ways tenure influences the ways Congress members cast their votes.

First, I will discuss the previous research conducted on congressional voting behavior and establish what is already known about the topic. I will also explain how my hypothesis fits within the existing literature. Then, I will explain the methodology of this project and define the concepts, measurements, and the hypothesis used in my research. In order to study the relationship between tenure and congressional voting behavior, I conducted a cross-sectional secondary data analysis of roll-call voting records from five congressional session of both chambers of Congress over the past 20 years. In this analysis, I first recorded the names and years served by each member of Congress. Afterwards, I looked at which Congress members voted against bills sponsored by a member of their same political party, and then compared how they voted to the length of time they spent in their position as a member of Congress by creating frequency tables and charts. The last section of this project will provide a discussion of the statistics drawn from the data and explain what they tell us about the relationship between tenure and congressional voting behavior. I will also discuss how this project contributes to future political science research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Motivations of Congressional Voting Behavior

Existing research focuses on several factors that may influence congressional voting behavior, including party influence and electoral concerns (Carson and Roberts 2013; Herrnson 2012; Smith 2007). However, there seems to be a gap in the literature which does not consider tenure as an influence of congressional voting behavior. Very little research has studied this relationship, and those limited studies have instead focused on the change in congressional voting behavior over the careers of Congress members. Stratmann (2000) found that junior members are more likely to vote with their political party because these newly elected members are unsure of the exact preferences of their constituency; to remedy this, they often take cues from the more senior members of the party on how to vote. However, my argument differs from this theory as my exploration is focused more on the existence of a direct relationship between tenure and congressional voting behavior. Previous studies that examine tenure as a factor of voting behavior look specifically at first term members of Congress, party unity, redistricting, and constituent concerns; my study, on the other hand, examines the Congress as a whole to determine if there is a relationship solely between tenure and voting behavior. Looking at these two factors alone will shed light on whether or not there is a relationship between tenure and voting behavior and could further inform us as to another predictor of how a member of Congress casts their vote.

Much of the research involving congressional voting behavior draws from David Mayhew's book "Congress: The Electoral Connection." The book is widely regarded by many political science researchers to have laid the foundation of congressional voting behavior research, and as a result, has heavily influenced research on this topic. Mayhew (1974) argues in this work that decisions made by Congress members (including how they cast their vote) are based on their main three desires: to seek re-election, to make good policy, and to have influence in Congress. The Congress member must be in office in order to have the ability to fulfill the final two desires; therefore, Congress members' main concern in office is to win re-election (Mayhew 1974; Rocca and Gordon 2010). Since newer Congress members do not have the same privilege of tenure the more senior members of Congress have, they do not have as long of a list of legislation passed for constituents, nor the opportunity to influence Congress. Following this logic based on Mayhew's assertions, Congress members with less tenure in office would be more concerned with winning re-election so they can create and pass legislation to aid their constituents and have some sort of influence in the institution. These motivations drive newer Congress members to make decisions based on their heightened concern for winning re-election. One avenue they pursue in order to help fulfill their three goals is maintaining loyalty to their political party.

2.2 Party Influence

Party influence is one of the primary topics that has been researched to explain congressional voting behavior, though examining party influence on Congress members also helps explain the relationship between a Congress member's tenure and voting behavior. Previous studies examine how the role of political parties influence the way

members of Congress vote on a given bill. Since Congress members are influenced by their political party, they often vote with their party (Poole 2007). Hager and Talbert (2000) found that there is a relationship between party influence and congressional voting behavior, and members of Congress maintain party loyalty and unity by voting with their party more often than the researchers expected.

More specifically, Cox and Poole (2002) found that party pressure not only plays a role in how a member of Congress decides to cast their vote on a roll-call vote, but it actually plays a major role in roll-call voting. Congress members may also feel pressured to vote with their political party and maintain party unity if the opposing political party appears united (Lebo, McGlynn, Koger 2007). Senior party leaders in Congress could sense the party unity of the opposing party and encourage party members to strengthen their own party through voting as a cohesive group. Moreover, the more senior members of the political party maintain party loyalty by voting with their party (Crook and Hibbing 1985). This could be because these members are the leaders of the party, and they want to set an example for the newer and less experienced Congress members, thus indirectly training newer Congress members to vote with the party by adhering to the agenda laid out by the seniority system. Additionally, Cox and McCubbins (1993) found that those Congress members who are members of the majority party wield the greatest influence in legislative deals, and the majority party leaders control the legislative structure and process. This provides greater incentive for newer members to adhere to the party's agenda, for if they follow the leaders of their party, they could become party leaders themselves and influence the legislative structure.

The seniority system within members of Congress' political parties also influence congressional voting behavior. Congress members are more inclined to vote with their party on roll-call votes and procedural votes because failure to do so can result in punishment from senior party members (Cox and Poole 2002; Ansolabehere et al. 2001). For example, a punishment could be placement on a committee that the Congress member has no interest in serving on (Kanthak 2009). This could be especially problematic for newer Congress members who are trying to exert some sort of influence in Congress and create legislation for their constituents that will help them win re-election. If a Congress member does vote with their party, however, they could earn rewards from the party leaders. Continuing with the example of committee placement, senior party members place loyal Congress members on more desirable committees which grants the Congress member more influence or a greater opportunity to pursue legislation they are interested in. Senior members use committee placement on more important committees as a selective incentive for Congress members to maintain party loyalty and vote with their party on a bill (Coker and Crain 1994).

Another reward for maintaining party loyalty in a vote is legislative success (Hasecke and Mycoff 2007). Congress members want to achieve legislative success (or passing a bill for their constituents) in order to gain credit and financial support which will help them in a re-election campaign; therefore, since party leaders influence legislative success, voting with the will of the party can help ensure legislative success in order to aid with the Congress member's re-election (Hasecke and Mycoff 2007; Mayhew 1974). Other studies have shown that party loyalty is also rewarded by the allotment of funds for the Congress member's state (Albouy 2013). When the Congress member aligns with their

political party, and if that party is the majority party, the Congress member is more likely to secure state funding. Securing this funding means that the Congress member would be more likely to win re-election because they have created good policy to aid their constituents (Albouy 2013; Mayhew 1974). Additionally, Congress members may take positions reflecting those of their political party so they can secure funding for their re-election campaign (Rocca and Gordon 2010). Overall, party loyalty can prove to be helpful when a Congress member is running for re-election. By campaign season, they have demonstrated to their political party and to interest groups they not only ideologically align themselves with the party but are also a reliable voter in Congress who does not stray from the will of the political party.

2.3 Congressional Voting Behavior and the Electorate

Congress members, however, must balance their loyalty to their party with the wishes of their constituency as it is the constituents who elect the Congress member to office, not the party. Oftentimes representatives do not represent their entire constituency; instead, they are most responsive to the concerns of certain groups within their constituencies which could help them secure re-election (Clinton 2006). Studies conducted about the relationship between congressional voting behavior and the concerns of the electorate have shown being too loyal to the political party can be costly to the Congress member, resulting in a decrease in electoral support and failure to secure re-election (Carson et al. 2010; Harbridge and Malhotra 2011; Lebo, McGlynn, and Koger 2007). This means that it could be even more crucial for newer members of Congress to not strictly follow party lines and instead vote against their party on certain bills. Constituents are more likely to take issue with a Congress member that votes only with their political party and

against the will of the constituents, leading the constituents to believe their Congress member is no longer representing them and instead are representing the political party (Carson et al. 2010). Researchers have found "safe" members of Congress, like incumbents, are more likely to be more partisan and stray from the will of their constituency because they are more likely to win re-election (Erikson 1971). However, members who are more at risk of losing re-election are more likely to cast votes that reflect their constituency's values and stances on issues (Harbridge and Malhotra 2011).

2.3.1 The Electorate and Partisanship

Congress members must ensure that they are being partisan enough to satisfy their political party and earn rewards, though they cannot be not too partisan as they do not want to disappoint their electorate and jeopardize their chances of re-election. State legislators recognize this challenge of balancing party and electorate concerns, so they draw the maps during the redistricting process in an effort to help those running for U.S. Congress. This has led to a cycle which helps explain why Congress seems so polarized in contemporary times. Brewer (2005) argues party elites (that is, politicians) have become more ideological. In turn, these party elites gerrymander the voting districts in order to ensure a candidate of their party will be elected to Congress (Carson et al. 2007; Carson and Roberts 2013). They do this by "cracking" voters of the opposing political party into several districts, to the point where the opposing political party's voices are washed out by the overwhelming majority of the mapmaker's political party. This makes the voters within districts appear more ideologically polarized, leading to the election of more partisan Congress members (Carson et al. 2007). Research has also found that the party's agenda

could change the Congress member's ideology, thus creating more problems when trying to balance party influence with electoral concerns (Roberts 2007).

Party influence and concerns about the electorate help us understand why members of Congress cast their votes the way they do. Congress members balance both of these influences so they can accomplish their three goals: make good policy, have influence in Congress, and win re-election (Mayhew 1974). Newer members of Congress share these goals, however, since they lack the experience and influence that the senior Congress members have, it is more challenging for these new members to achieve these three goals. Therefore, it is critical for newer members of Congress to win re-election so that they can accomplish their other two goals. The literature provides reason to believe that newer members of Congress are more likely to maintain party unity on a vote for a bill because these members want to earn rewards and favors that will help them achieve Mayhew's three goals.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Hypothesis and Measurement of Concepts

My methodology is based on the following hypothesis, which I test in this project: As a Congress member's time in office increases, the likelihood of a Congress member committing party treason increases. I define party treason as a member of Congress voting "Nay" or "No" to a bill sponsored by their own party. Party treason is important because it is one of the most distinguishable and influential ways that a member of Congress can rebel against their political party.

The independent variable for this study is the amount of time a Congress member spends in office. This variable is measured in whole years, for example, one, two, or three years. I do not use fractions or decimals in measuring the independent variable. Additionally, I measure the total number of years a Congress member has served in their position as either a member of the House of Representatives or the Senate. In the case that a Congress member has served as both a representative and a senator, I only measure the number of years that Congress member has been in office in the specific position for the vote of the bill I study. So, for example, if a member of Congress has served first in Congress for four years in the House and then six years in the Senate, but the bill I review was voted on when the Congress member was in the Senate for two years at that time, then the total number of years that Congress member has served in my data is two.

The dependent variable for this project is the number of times the Congress member commits party treason, and I coded the votes of each Congress member in my data. Congress members who voted with their party (compared to the party of the Congress member who sponsored the bill) have a value of "0" entered in the code. Members of Congress who commit party treason by voting against a bill sponsored by a member of their own party have a value of "1" entered in the code.

I only include roll-call votes in my data for the Senate and the House of Representatives. I made this decision because roll-call votes allow me to see which specific members of Congress voted for or against a bill. This also limits the amount of data I collect, since each chamber of Congress typically votes on several hundred different questions each year. My data for the House of Representatives only includes yea-or-nay votes for the same reason. Additionally, I only measure votes with the voting question, "On Passage" for both the Senate and the House in this research project. Again, I do this because this significantly narrows the scope of the project and allows it to be more focused. Since Congress votes on hundreds of motions every session – many of them uncontroversial – only looking at "On Passage" questions allows a closer look at a more specific group of votes. Using this method also permits a look at those votes that are considered to be more controversial or have more of an impact on policy if passed. If an "On Passage" question receives enough votes, this bill could become policy. This means it has extra importance in Congress, in comparison to other votes taken, like the establishment of House rules at the beginning of each session. These votes are typically agreed to unanimously by members of both parties. Examining "On the Passage" votes specifically allows me to examine votes that are more consequential and better demonstrate how different competing factors, like

tenure, can affect how a Congress member votes on a bill. For those members who do not vote, I do not count that as committing party treason, as they did not explicitly go out of their way and vote with the opposing political party.

Since this is a cross-sectional secondary data analysis, I look at several congressional sessions over the span of the past 20 years. I examine the following sessions of Congress: the 106th session, the 109th session, the 111th session, the 114th session, and the 116th session. Completing a cross-sectional analysis allows me to determine if there is a change in the relationship between the amount of time served in office and how often a Congress member commits party treason. This lets me determine if the pattern I see across the data is one that can be seen at several points in time, ensuring it is not just a random occurrence.

3.2 Data Collection Strategy

This project is a cross-sectional secondary data analysis of data I collect from several different sources. I collect most of my data from the Congressional Votes Database at Govtrack.us in addition to the House of Representatives' Clerk website, clerk.house.gov. These websites provide information about how each individual representative and senator voted on various bills, motions, and voting questions in Congress. Govtrack.us also names the Congress person who sponsored each bill, along with their party affiliation. I collect the data about the number of years each Congress member has served in office from the Library of Congress at Congress.gov, which lists each Congress member and which years they have served as a representative, a senator, or both.

3.3 Data Analysis

After collecting the data, I compile the information into an Excel spreadsheet. Each individual chamber in each session of Congress has its own spreadsheet. Then, I use JASP (a statistics program) to run descriptive statistics about my data, including finding the mean number of party treason occurrences for each congressional session of each chamber of Congress. Afterwards, I use JASP to create frequency tables for each chamber and session. This data allows me to determine the relationship between the number of years a Congress member serves in their seat and the total number of times a Congress member commits party treason. Moreover, this allows me to easily visualize the data and determine if there are any patterns.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results from my data collection showed there is a negative relationship between the number of years a member of Congress spent in office and the total number of times a Congress member committed party treason. This relationship seemed to hold true in the House of Representatives with the newer members of Congress consistently voting against bills sponsored by a member of their own political party more often than the older members of Congress. This is not to say that there were not outliers; some House members served in their seat for 20 or more years and continued to vote against the party of the bill's sponsor.

The Senate, while there was a negative relationship between the two variables in this project, did not consistently appear to have the same frequency patterns. During the 111th and 116th sessions of the Senate, the total number of times a member committed party treason was lower, and the overall number of senators who did not commit party treason at all was at the highest during these two sessions. For the 116th session of the Senate, this could be because overall fewer bills were voted on during this session. This may be due to the COVID-19 pandemic as the legislature was focused with trying to handle the public health crisis.

Based on the data analysis, including the frequency tables and charts (see Appendix A for descriptive statistic tables and Appendix B for frequency charts), I can reject my hypothesis that those more senior members of Congress are more likely to commit party

treason, or vote against a bill sponsored by a member of their own political party. In fact, the relationship seems to be quite the opposite: members who had served shorter tenures in both houses of Congress were more likely to commit party treason. The total number of party treason occurrences were higher for those members who had served in either chamber of Congress between 0-10 years. This relationship can be seen over the five congressional sessions that were examined in this project.

The negative relationship between the two variables could exist for several reasons. First, newer members in Congress may want to try to stand out amongst a crowd of potentially dozens of other newly elected Congress members. This can be especially important in the House due to the high number of representatives in the chamber. It is possible newer members of Congress may vote against their party strategically so they can try to gain power and prestige within their own political party. In fact, Mayhew (2002) has found that members of Congress commit these actions in order to gain public notice of politically aware constituents. Congress members can attempt to gain the attention of the public by several means, including publicly disagreeing with the president's Cabinet appointments and policy initiatives as well as killing bills their political parties are trying to pass in Congress. Therefore, based on my results, it is quite possible Congress members commit party treason as another way for them to distinguish themselves and gain the public's attention, thereby garnering more influence in their constituencies and increasing their name recognition across the nation. This is a critical advantage should the Congress member intend to become a leader in their political party, or eye a future presidential campaign.

For example, Congressman Paul Ryan committed party treason six times in his first session as a representative during the 106th session of Congress. During the 109th session, he committed party treason five times. Ryan committed party treason enough to make him stand out among the other representatives in the House, though he did not extensively commit party treason to the point the Republican party would believe he is not loyal to the party. This strategy ended up benefiting his political career, as he ran as Mitt Romney's vice-presidential candidate in 2012 and served as Speaker of the House from 2015-19. Committing party treason a handful of times was not the sole reason why Ryan reaped these rewards from his party; however, this relationship could be one factor that contributed to his political success.

Additionally, the negative relationship may exist is because it is possible the newer members of Congress were elected to Congress because of their willingness to vote against their party. This can be demonstrated when examining which members of Congress committed party treason most frequently. For example, during the 114th and 116th sessions of the Senate, Senators Ted Cruz, Mike Lee, and Rand Paul were among some of the senators that committed party treason the most. These senators in particular were both newer members of the Senate (Cruz had served three years by the start of the 114th session, while Lee and Paul had both served for five), in addition to being among some of the most ideologically conservative members of the Senate. Therefore, these senators may have been elected in response to a growing conservative electorate that wanted their conservative ideology reflected in Congress.

Interestingly, this is contradictory to the findings in Stratmann's study, in which it was hypothesized and discovered data which supported the argument that newer members

are not yet totally aware of their constituents' concerns and political preferences, so these members take cues from their senior members of the political party to help gauge the wishes of their own constituencies. Based on my own findings, it seems that the opposite relationship exists: Newer members could be elected to office because they are more aware and responsive to constituency preferences. This could even be observed as recently as during the present session of the House. During the 116th session of Congress, Representatives Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Presley, and Rashida Tlaib were all elected to serve their first term in the House. Between these 4 representatives, they committed party treason 34 times in this one session of Congress alone. Like the aforementioned senators, these representatives are also at the far end of their party's ideological spectrum. So, it is possible these women were voted into office because of their more progressive views and their willingness to vote against their party in order to support these views. While some recently elected members may look to their senior members for voting cues, others may be elected due to their willingness to be more attentive to the needs of their constituencies, and not having to learn about their constituencies' preferences while they are already in office.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research study was to determine if there was a relationship between the amount of time a Congress member served in office and the way Congress members voted on a bill. My hypothesis was, "As a Congress member's time in office increases, the likelihood of a Congress member committing party treason increases." In order to test my hypothesis, I conducted a cross-sectional secondary data analysis which examined the relationship between the number of years members of each chamber of Congress over the span of five congressional sessions during the past 20 years and the total number of times each member committed party treason. I used this data to find descriptive statistics and create frequency tables and charts to determine if a relationship existed between these two variables, and what the relationship looked like if one was discovered.

After completing this research project, I can reject my hypothesis. There was a negative relationship between the two variables in my project across every session of the House and Senate that collected and analyzed data for. Although I rejected my hypothesis, the results of this research project are relevant. This project demonstrated there is a relationship between tenure and congressional voting behavior. However, this project did not explore the strength of this relationship. Future research could focus on the strength of the relationship between the variables tested in this study. Additionally, future research on this topic could examine other types of votes beyond the votes I looked at in my study. It

would be interesting to see if this negative relationship still exists when examining other votes. Finally, future research could explore if this relationship is the same during other periods of American history. This study focused primarily on the 21st century, so another researcher could focus on the late 20th century, for example.

More significantly, future research can compare the number of times Congressional leaders committed party treason during their first sessions in Congress to the number of times other Congress members who did not serve in leadership positions committed party treason during their first sessions in Congress. This could further expand on the idea that Congress members commit party treason as a way to gain the attention of party leaders and the public, distinguishing them and making them more prominent and influential in both spheres. If party leaders are more likely to commit party treason during their first sessions in Congress, tenure could be a factor in predicting future party leadership.

The findings of this study help explain why some members of Congress vote the way they do on certain bills. This information helps both political scientists and those outside of the discipline understand how they are being represented in our nation's legislature. Research in this study illustrates Congress members deal with a variety of different factors when they are considering a bill. Although our Congress members are supposed to stand for what their constituents want, members of Congress are often at the mercy of other political considerations, such as party loyalty and electoral concerns, and, based on this study, the amount of time they have served in office. Going forward in our increasingly divided nation, it would be interesting to see if this relationship between tenure and congressional voting behavior continues to exist, or if the relationship changes.

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the 106th Congress – House

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	872	872
Missing	0	0
Mean	8.935	1.310
Std. Deviation	7.552	2.852
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	45.000	35.000

Table 2: Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 106th Congress – House

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	536	61.468	61.468	61.468
1	107	12.271	12.271	73.739
2	75	8.601	8.601	82.339
3	53	6.078	6.078	88.417
4	36	4.128	4.128	92.546
5	17	1.950	1.950	94.495
6	13	1.491	1.491	95.986
7	5	0.573	0.573	96.560
8	5	0.573	0.573	97.133
9	6	0.688	0.688	97.821
10	1	0.115	0.115	97.936
11	6	0.688	0.688	98.624
13	4	0.459	0.459	99.083
14	1	0.115	0.115	99.197
15	2	0.229	0.229	99.427
17	2	0.229	0.229	99.656
21	1	0.115	0.115	99.771
28	1	0.115	0.115	99.885
35	1	0.115	0.115	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	872	100.000		

Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics for the 109th Congress – House

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	880	880
Missing	0	0
Mean	10.593	1.094
Std. Deviation	8.052	2.092
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	51.000	29.000

Table 4 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 109th Congress – House

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	533	60.568	60.568	60.568
1	81	9.205	9.205	69.773
2	139	15.795	15.795	85.568
3	62	7.045	7.045	92.614
4	28	3.182	3.182	95.795
5	10	1.136	1.136	96.932
6	4	0.455	0.455	97.386
7	6	0.682	0.682	98.068
8	6	0.682	0.682	98.750
9	3	0.341	0.341	99.091
10	3	0.341	0.341	99.432
12	2	0.227	0.227	99.659
15	1	0.114	0.114	99.773
17	1	0.114	0.114	99.886
29	1	0.114	0.114	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	880	100.000		

Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics for the 111th Congress – House

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	881	881

Table 5 - Descriptive Statistics for the 111th Congress – House

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Missing	0	0
Mean	10.787	0.564
Std. Deviation	9.052	1.397
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	55.000	12.000

Table 6 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 111th Congress – House

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	652	74.007	74.007	74.007
1	122	13.848	13.848	87.855
2	52	5.902	5.902	93.757
3	20	2.270	2.270	96.027
4	14	1.589	1.589	97.616
5	7	0.795	0.795	98.411
6	3	0.341	0.341	98.751
7	2	0.227	0.227	98.978
8	3	0.341	0.341	99.319
9	1	0.114	0.114	99.432
10	2	0.227	0.227	99.659
11	1	0.114	0.114	99.773
12	2	0.227	0.227	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	881	100.000		

Table 7 - Descriptive Statistics for the 114th Congress – House

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	878	878
Missing	0	0
Mean	9.501	1.067
Std. Deviation	9.126	1.885
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	61.000	22.000

Table 8 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 114th Congress – House

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	481	54.784	54.784	54.784
1	178	20.273	20.273	75.057
2	89	10.137	10.137	85.194
3	67	7.631	7.631	92.825
4	25	2.847	2.847	95.672
5	13	1.481	1.481	97.153
6	10	1.139	1.139	98.292
7	4	0.456	0.456	98.747
8	5	0.569	0.569	99.317
9	1	0.114	0.114	99.431
10	1	0.114	0.114	99.544
13	1	0.114	0.114	99.658
16	1	0.114	0.114	99.772
17	1	0.114	0.114	99.886
22	1	0.114	0.114	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	878	100.000		

Table 9 - Descriptive Statistics for the 116th Congress – House

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	870	870
Missing	0	0
Mean	9.115	0.347
Std. Deviation	9.031	0.914
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	47.000	9.000

Table 10 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 116th Congress – House

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	705	81.034	81.034	81.034
1	92	10.575	10.575	91.609
2	40	4.598	4.598	96.207
3	17	1.954	1.954	98.161
4	9	1.034	1.034	99.195
5	4	0.460	0.460	99.655
6	1	0.115	0.115	99.770
8	1	0.115	0.115	99.885
9	1	0.115	0.115	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	870	100.000		

Table 11 - Descriptive Statistics for the 106th Congress – Senate

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	202	202
Missing	0	0
Mean	11.465	0.817
Std. Deviation	9.910	1.324
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	47.000	7.000

Table 12 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 106th Congress – Senate

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	128	63.366	63.366	63.366
1	27	13.366	13.366	76.733
2	19	9.406	9.406	86.139
3	18	8.911	8.911	95.050
4	7	3.465	3.465	98.515
5	1	0.495	0.495	99.010
6	1	0.495	0.495	99.505
7	1	0.495	0.495	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	202	100.000		

Table 13 - Descriptive Statistics for the 109th Congress – Senate

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	201	201
Missing	0	0
Mean	12.766	0.766
Std. Deviation	10.386	1.204
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	47.000	7.000

Table 14 – Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 109th Congress – Senate

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	124	61.692	61.692	61.692
1	31	15.423	15.423	77.114
2	26	12.935	12.935	90.050
3	14	6.965	6.965	97.015
4	3	1.493	1.493	98.507
5	2	0.995	0.995	99.502
7	1	0.498	0.498	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	201	100.000		

Table 15 - Descriptive Statistics for the 111th Congress – Senate

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	210	210
Missing	0	0
Mean	12.276	0.167
Std. Deviation	11.227	0.682
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	51.000	6.000

Table 16 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 111th Congress – Senate

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	191	90.952	90.952	90.952
1	12	5.714	5.714	96.667
2	3	1.429	1.429	98.095
3	2	0.952	0.952	99.048
5	1	0.476	0.476	99.524
6	1	0.476	0.476	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	210	100.000		

Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics for the 114th Congress – Senate

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	200	200
Missing	0	0
Mean	9.910	0.790
Std. Deviation	9.438	1.492
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	41.000	7.000

Table 18 - Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 114th Congress – Senate

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	136	68.000	68.000	68.000
1	27	13.500	13.500	81.500
2	11	5.500	5.500	87.000
3	10	5.000	5.000	92.000
4	7	3.500	3.500	95.500
5	5	2.500	2.500	98.000
6	2	1.000	1.000	99.000
7	2	1.000	1.000	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	200	100.000		

Table 19 – Descriptive Statistics for the 116th Congress – Senate

	Time in Office (Years)	Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Valid	200	200
Missing	0	0
Mean	10.475	0.275
Std. Deviation	8.784	0.567
Minimum	0.000	0.000
Maximum	45.000	4.000

Table 20 – Frequencies for Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences for the 116th Congress – Senate

Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	154	77.000	77.000	77.000
1	39	19.500	19.500	96.500
2	6	3.000	3.000	99.500
4	1	0.500	0.500	100.000
Missing	0	0.000		
Total	200	100.000		

APPENDIX B

FREQUENCY CHARTS

Figure 1



Figure 2



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5



Figure 6



Figure 7



Figure 8



Figure 9


Party Treason Occurrences, 114th Congress - Senate
Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Time in Office (Years)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45

Figure 10


Party Treason Occurrences, 116th Congress - Senate
Total Number of Party Treason Occurrences
Time in Office (Years)
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50

REFERENCES

Albouy, David. 2013. "Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds." Review of Economics and Statistics 95 (1): 127-141.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Snyder, Jr., and Charles Stewart III. 2001. "The Effects of Party and Preferences on Congressional Roll-Call Voting." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26 (4): 533–572.

Brewer, Mark D. 2005. "The Rise of Partisanship and the Expansion of Partisan Conflict within the American Electorate." Political Research Quarterly 58 (2): 219-229.

Carson, Jamie L., Michael H. Crespin, Charles J. Finocchiaro, and David W. Rhode. 2007. "Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Politics Research* 35 (6): 878-904.

Carson, Jamie L., Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young. 2010. "The Electoral Costs of Party Loyalty in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* 54 (3): 598-616.

Carson, Jamie L., and Jason M. Roberts. 2013. *Ambition, Competition, and Electoral Reform: The Politics of Congressional Elections Across Time*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Clinton, Joshua D. 2006. "Representation in Congress: Constituents and Roll Calls in the 106th House." *The Journal of Politics* 68 (2): 397-409.

Coker, David C., and W. Mark Crain. 1994. “Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions.” *Public Choice* 81 (3/4): 195–221.

Cox, Gary W., and Matthew D. McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, Gary W., and Keith T. Poole. 2002. “On Measuring Partisanship in Roll-Call Voting: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1877-1999.” *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (3): 477–489.

Crook, Sara Brandes, and John R. Hibbing. 1985. “Congressional Reform and Party Discipline: The Effects of Changes in the Seniority System on Party Loyalty in the US House of Representatives.” *British Journal of Political Science* 15 (2): 207–226.

Disalvo, Daniel. 2012. *Engines of Change: Party Factions in American Politics, 1868-2010*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Erikson, Robert S. 1971. “The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections.” *Polity* 3 (3): 395-405.

GovTrack. 2020. “Congressional Votes Database.” https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes#session=__ALL__ (accessed November 1, 2020).

Hager, Gregory L., and Jeffery C. Talbert. 2000. “Look for the Party Label: Party Influences on Voting in the U. S. House.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25 (1): 75–99.

Harbridge, Laurel, and Neil Malhotra. 2011. “Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments.” *American Journal of Political Science* 55 (3): 494-510.

Hasecke, Edward B., and Jason D. Mycoff. 2007. “Party Loyalty and Legislative Success: Are Loyal Majority Party Members More Successful in the U.S. House of Representatives?” *Political Research Quarterly* 60 (4): 607-617.

Herrnson, Paul S. 2012. *Congressional Elections: Campaigning at Home and in Washington*. Los Angeles: CQ Press.

JASP Team (2020). JASP (Version 0.14) [Computer software].

Kanthak, Kristin. 2009. “U. S. State Legislative Committee Assignments and Encouragement of Party Loyalty: An Exploratory Analysis.” *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 9 (3): 284–303.

Lebo, Matthew J., Adam J. McGlynn, and Gregory Koger. 2007. “Strategic Party Government: Party Influence in Congress, 1789-2000.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51 (3): 464-481.

Lewis, Jeffrey B., Keith Poole, Howard Rosenthal, Adam Boche, Aaron Rudkin, and Luke Sonnet. 2020. “Voteview: Congressional Roll-Call Votes Database.” https://voteview.com/ (accessed October 5, 2020).

Library of Congress. 2020. “Legislative Search Results – Congress.gov.” https://www.congress.gov/search?q={%22source%22:%22members%22}&searchResultViewType=expanded (accessed November 1, 2020).

Locke, John. 2008. “Second Treatise of Government.” In *Modern Political Thought: Readings from Machiavelli to Nietzsche,* 2nd edition, ed. David Wootton. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Mayhew, David. 2002. *America’s Congress: Actions in the Public Sphere, James Madison Through Newt Gingrich*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Mayhew, David. 1974. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Poole, Keith T. 2007. "Changing Minds? Not in Congress!" *Public Choice* 131 (3/4): 435–451.

Roberts, Jason M. 2007. "The Statistical Analysis of Roll-Call Data: A Cautionary Tale." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 32 (3): 341-360.

Rocca, Michael S., and Stacy B. Gordon. 2010. "The Position-taking Value of Bill Sponsorship in Congress." *Political Research Quarterly* 63 (2): 387-397.

Smith, Steven S. 2007. *Party Influence in Congress*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stratmann, Thomas. 2000. "Congressional Voting over Legislative Careers: Shifting Positions and Changing Constraints." *The American Political Science Review* 94 (3): 665–676.

United States House of Representative Clerk. 2020. "Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives – Votes." https://clerk.house.gov/Votes (accessed November 1, 2020.)

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Carrington Matthews graduated with an Honors Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and a minor in History at The University of Texas at Arlington in Spring 2021. Her research interests include American political thought, the U.S. presidency and Congress, and U.S. Cold War history. Her piece titled "The Baltic States' Relations with Russia" was published in UTA's undergraduate research journal, *Global Insight*, in Fall 2020. Carrington served as a Lead Advocate for the UTA Honors College, Peer Academic Leader for the Office of New Student Courses, and Consultant for the English Writing Center. Additionally, she was the President of Pi Sigma Alpha and Executive Officer of the Society of Political Affairs. She is also a current member of Phi Kappa Phi. Carrington spent her Spring 2021 semester as a member of the Archer Fellowship program, an opportunity in which she interned full-time in Washington, D.C. while she studied policymaking and advocacy. She plans to attend graduate school to expand her knowledge of American political processes and intends to become involved in political research.