5-1-2021

THIS IS NOT THAT DAWN: THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONAL SORROWS OF THE PARTITION OF INDIA

Basmah Arshad

THIS IS NOT THAT DAWN: THE INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONAL SORROWS OF THE PARTITION OF INDIA

by

BASMAH ARSHAD

Presented to the Faculty of the Honors College of
The University of Texas at Arlington in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of

HONORS BACHELOR OF ARTS IN HISTORY

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT ARLINGTON

May 2021

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful for the continued guidance of my mentor, Dr Joyce Goldberg. This capstone could not have been completed without her giving me the confidence to pursue this topic and then carefully marking up each of my many, many drafts until my writing was coherent and fit for publication. Thank you for putting up with me and every "sprinkle" of dashes!

Thank you to my family for being a constant source of support and affirmation throughout this project. I am glad that my younger siblings constantly forced me to step away from the capstone to breathe and take a break by asking me to make macaroni and cheese, break apart Lego pieces, or watch some bizarre Delta airline conspiracy video from 2014. I am doubly grateful for my parents for being patient and encouraging not only throughout the process of writing this capstone, but in raising me overall. I love you, thank you!

November 15, 2019

ABSTRACT

THIS IS NOT THAT DAWN: THE INDIVIDUAL
AND INTERNATIONAL SORROWS OF
THE PARTITION OF INDIA

Basmah Arshad, B.A. History

The University of Texas at Arlington, 2021

Faculty Mentor: Joyce Goldberg

In August 1947, British India became two independent states: India and Pakistan. Historians refer to this event as "the Partition," and acknowledge that it became an incredibly violent event in which upwards of two million people – men, women, and children – lost their lives due to decisions made by statesmen. The Partition has been described in accounts and statements of politicians or other public figures. This project takes that existing historical literature and builds upon it using oral histories collected by the 1947 Partition Archive organization and the Partition Museum located in Amritsar, India. As of November 2019, there are around ninety interviews available by both sources combined. The subjects of these oral histories, whose memories may be tempered and molded by the passage of time, offer a revealing perspective that provides a deeper understanding of how the trauma of the Partition affected internal and external

developments of India and Pakistan, from society and culture to national identity and foreign policy during the early stages of the Cold War. These oral histories shed light on the enduring legacy of the Partition and how the many complexities, agonies, and human costs of this event were never resolved or even acknowledged.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In August 1947, poet Faiz Ahmed Faiz wrote a poem entitled *Subh-e-Azadi*, or *Dawn of Freedom*. Written days after the Partition of India, Faiz writes that "this light, smeared and spotted, this night-bitten dawn / this isn't surely the dawn we waited for so eagerly."[1] These words reflect Faiz's clear anguish over the Partition, over securing independence only to watch families and communities destroy themselves, home by home and limb by limb, from the inside out in a mad scramble to migrate. The Partition did not lead to the sweet, idealized freedom for which Indians had fought and died. Come dawn, it was clear that the Partition had only torn up the nation in a brutal and devastating stroke of the pen.

Days before Faiz picked up his pen, on the warm evening of August 14 and the cool dawn of August 15, the British government formally ceded sovereignty to India, its once-prized colony and the jewel of its crown. The British divided its former colony into independent states: India, a homeland for all South Asians, and Pakistan, a homeland specific to South Asian Muslims. In history books, this division is labeled "the Partition of India," a neutral phrase implying neither optimism nor pessimism. As Faiz's poem demonstrates however, the Partition has not been viewed in a neutral way. In casual conversation, in still-fresh memories, and in reality, the Partition invoked everything but

[1] The Penguin India Blog. "Subh-e-Azadi, An Anguished Evocation of the Pain of Partition." The Penguin Digest. Penguin Random House, August 14, 2017. Cited hereafter as "Subh-e-Azadi, 2017."

neutral emotions. When the idea of Partition first entered conversations, there were fierce debates over its perceived necessity, costs, validity, or lack thereof. These debates did not end when the lines were finally, officially printed on the map.

The Partition gave way to intense violence and chaos, fueled by the general confusion surrounding the Partition *during* the Partition itself. It made the moment, already emotionally-fraught, all the more bloody and painful. Families were ordered to pack all their worldly belongings and migrate either to Pakistan or India, whichever state religion tied them to. Some families migrated and found a new home in a freshly-minted state. Some families stepped out the door and were promptly butchered by the neighbor with whom they used to play cricket and drink tea. Some families stepped onto a train and were stabbed and doused in gasoline by strangers who wanted them dead for reasons never made clear. Some families arrived intact and stepped into their new homes only to be dragged out and away by an enraged community determine to reject and remove newcomers on sight. The Partition was a messy affair and upwards of two million people were murdered and an additional fourteen million were displaced.[2] It was one of the largest population movements in history, and the affected populations continue to struggle with this history and trauma.

Beyond the people directly affected, the Partition had significant international implications: it was a significant contributor to the slow, but sure, death of the centuries-old British empire. Indian independence signaled the start of a period of decolonization across Africa and Asia, as colonists grew increasingly bolder and more insistent with their demands. Britain and other European powers ceded sovereignty unwillingly, and

[2] Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh. *The Partition of India*. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. Page 2. Cited hereafter as "Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Page #."

sometimes only because the former colonial subjects had pried it away by force. The Partition also occurred during the early days of the Cold War, when the United States and the Soviet Union were each attempting to assert dominance in world affairs by taking advantage of and building strong connections to existing and newborn states, with India and Pakistan falling into the latter category.

Survivors of the Partition living today were either children or young adults when the Partition occurred. Some saw the violence first-hand and barely dodged death. Some have only limited memories, or only know of it through their friends and family members. Some emerged with vague memories of field trips to refugee camps, influxes of new neighbors piling into cities, or some other experience that indicated that something fundamental had changed around them. These survivors grew up and watched people attempt to recover from the Partition. While memoirs, recorded speeches, news articles, and official documents permit a clinical understanding of the political or international impact of the Partition, the memories of these survivors offer a human perspective of how the Partition affected *people*, not just as collections of numbers. Beyond the rumbles of international politics and the system, the Partition was a real event where real people who had been living in a home for centuries were forcibly, violently uprooted and made to leave because of the smooth, single stroke of a pen.

The Partition shapes the national memories and identities of both India and Pakistan to this day. The violence of the Partition, stirred by a combination of gender or religious-based motivations and the miserable refugee crisis that it produced, remains misunderstood and contested today in Indo-Pakistani relations, shrouding with hostility and suspicion every interaction between the two states. The two states have engaged in direct warfare

four times since independence, with three of those instances occurring over the disputed territory of Kashmir, and one of those instances occurring soon after both states had tested nuclear weapons capabilities. Both sides have made attempts to end hostilities and move toward friendly relations, but these attempts have done little more than fizzle out into a flimsy, dangerous peace that threatens to be broken day by day.

As Faiz mournfully remarked, "the weight of the night hasn't lifted yet / the moment for the emancipation of the eyes / and the heart hasn't come yet."[3] The Partition left too much unresolved, with the people unable to fully recover from the loss of homes, family, and their old lives and statesmen willfully looking past the human costs as much as they could to focus instead on issues of territory, economy, and diplomacy. The old, idealized vision of freedom was simply incompatible with this harsh reality.

[3] Subh-e-Azadi, 2017.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

The Partition of India marked the end of a century of the British *Raj*, or British colonial rule in India. Through the East India Company, a joint-stock company designed to facilitate trade in South and Southeast Asia, the British established a trading relationship with India in 1612 before eventually seizing control and ruling over India.[4] Following the massive but failed Indian Rebellion of 1857, or, as referred to by Indians, the First War for Independence, the British government stepped in and in 1858 established colonial rule over India.[5] British rule is infamous for directing the large-scale industrialization of India and constructing railroads, irrigation systems, and other infrastructure projects across the colony. British rule is further known by the extremely severe famines that occurred in India during this period and the British government's lackluster response and general mismanagement of the famines that resulted in upwards of fifty million preventable deaths over roughly four centuries of British rule.[6] Additionally, India had a heterogeneous population, due to its immense ethnic and religious diversity.[7] Taking advantage of this heterogeneous population, British rulers followed a "divide and conquer" policy, deliberately exploited differences between the Hindu and Muslim communities, India's

[4] Moonis Ahmar. "The Politics of Conflict and Cooperation In South Asia." *Pakistan Horizon* 35, no. 3 (1982): 44-59. Page 47. Cited hereafter as "Moonis, Page #."
[5] Moonis, Page 47.
[6] David Arnold. "Vagrant India: Famine, Poverty, and Welfare under Colonial Rule." In *Cast Out: Vagrancy and Homelessness in Global and Historical Perspective*, edited by Beier A. L. and Ocobock Paul, 117-39. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008. Page 127.
[7] Moonis, Page 46.

two largest religious groups.[8] Escalating tensions between these two communities prevented Indians from fighting against British rule as a single unit and subsequently ensured stable British rule.[9]



Figure 2.1: Religious Breakdown of India, Pre-Partition[10]

Even divided however, Indians resisted and fought British rule over the subcontinent. Movements for independence, like the Indian Rebellion of 1857, were fractured and rooted around the demands of specific populations within India instead of rooted around a unified, national Indian identity. The 1857 Rebellion, for example, was

[8] Ibid., Page 48.
[9] Ibid., Page 48.
[10] *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Oxford University Press, 1909.

initiated by sepoys, who were soldiers recruited by the East India Company. A significant majority of those sepoys were Hindus who perceived the British presence in India as a specific threat to them.[11] Although Muslim sepoys were also involved with the Rebellion, the majority of the Muslim community held mixed opinions about participating, as they did not view the British as a threat to their existence because the British respected their religious rights.[12] The Rebellion is an early example of the effectiveness of the "divide and conquer" policy. It was difficult for one group to remove the British on their own and more difficult still to build consensus and support all across India when each group, each subsection of the population, had different demands, priorities, and perceptions of the British.

The Quit India movement of 1942 – nearly a century after the Rebellion – further demonstrates the lack of unity and cooperation amongst Indians when it came to British rule. Launched in 1942 by lawyer Mohandas Gandhi, who was later known and revered as "Mahatma" Gandhi, or Father Gandhi, the Quit India movement attempted to peacefully demand an end to colonial rule in India.[13] The movement was Gandhi's attempt to build Indian unity, functioning as a response to both British colonial rule and the threat of disunity and division in India, the latter a specific fear for Gandhi because he "[could not] swallow the splitting of India [...] I alone know what pain the thought has caused me."[14] However, despite these specific intentions, he alienated the Muslim community by ignoring their specific demands and concerns, and ultimately did not bridge the gap between the

[11] Ayesha Jalal. *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008. Pages 129 – 131. Cited hereafter as "Jalal, *Partisans of Allah*, Page #."
[12] Jalal, *Partisans of Allah,* Pages 129 – 131.
[13] Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre. *Freedom at Midnight*. Vikas Publishing House, 1975. Pages 49, 56, 72. Cited hereafter as "Collins and Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*, Page #."
[14] Nasim Yousaf. *Mahatma Gandhi and My Grandfather, Allama Mashriqi*. AMZ Publications, 2013. Page 103. Cited hereafter as "Nasim, *Mahatma Gandhi and My Grandfather*, Page #."

Hindu and Muslim communities.[15] He was unable to establish and rally support for a national Indian identity because the British had been effective in dividing the population, to the point where there was no common Indian identity around which Gandhi could effectively reference and root his movement.[16] Gandhi's movement failed because he gravely underestimated the specific need for *Hindu-Muslim* unity, not just broad Indian unity, and the need to repair the damage the British had inflicted on the relationship between the two groups.[17]

Beyond direct action, avenues of participation in the British government further reflected the deep divisions within Indian society. The Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League were two separate political parties for Indians to express their views on the governance and political developments of their nation to the British.[18] Founded in 1885, Congress claimed to speak for all Indians, crossing religious and ethnic lines.[19] From the early 1900s, Congress had increasingly promoted Indian independence, again with the claim that independence was desired by *all* Indians on the same grounds.[20] Gandhi was a critical member of Congress during the last decades of British rule, as was Jawaharlal Nehru, another activist and leader of the Indian independence movement.

The League, in contrast, founded in 1906, claimed to represent various Muslim populations in India.[21] Initially intended to simply express concerns specific to Muslims, the League eventually advocated a separate Muslim state, as opposed to Congress's vision

[15] Nasim, *Mahatma Gandhi and My Grandfather*, Page 104.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Shashi Tharoor. *Nehru: The Invention of India*. Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2018. Page xiii. Cited hereafter as "Tharoor, *Nehru: The Invention of India*, Page #."
[19] Tharoor, *Nehru: The Invention of India*, Pages xv – xvi.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

of an independent and whole India.[22] Demands for a separate Muslim state were in line with the Two-Nation Theory, which specifically argued for the establishment of a Muslim homeland in South Asia because the larger Hindu population was a threat to the safety of the Muslim population. If Hindus were to rule over Muslims, would they offer and protect the religious rights of Muslims, or would they face subjugation and oppression under Hindu rule? According to the Two-Nation Theory, not only was the latter possibility a risk that Indian Muslims could not take, but it was also a highly likely possibility. This separate Muslim state would be called Pakistan, a name coined by nationalist Choudhry Rahmat Ali in 1933 to refer to Muslim-majority areas in Northern India, with *P* for *P*unjab, *A* for *A*fghania, *K* for *K*ashmir, and the *stan* referring to Baloch*istan*. *Pakistan* further translated to *land of the pure*, while *Hindustan*, as India was popularly referred to, translated to *land of the Hindus*.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a lawyer, played a key role in the League. He claimed leadership over India's Muslim population, and, like other League members, he advocated the establishment of an independent Pakistani state.[23] Jinnah argued that "[there could not be] Pakistan without securing freedom of Hindustan," acknowledging that Pakistan's existence necessitated broad Indian emancipation.[24] Congress and the League both agreed on an independent India, but, according to Jinnah, the League saw Pakistan as a medium to "bring Muslim India under one banner, on one stage and one goal," building directly on the principles of the Two-Nation Theory.[25]

---

[22] Ibid.
[23] Yasmin Khan. *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. Page 3. Cited hereafter as "Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page #."
[24] Mahomed Ali Jinnah. *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*. Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960. Pages 33, 245. Cited hereafter as "Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, Page #."
[25] Jinnah, *Speeches and Writings*, Pages 33, 245.

Jinnah organized Direct Action Day in August 1946, a peaceful *hartal*, or a general strike, meant to demonstrate the sheer demand for Pakistan.[26] It was created to respond to the threat of an independent but unified India that was posed by Congress. Direct Action Day, however, dissolved into lengthy and brutal episodes of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims because this movement was launched during an existing period of communal tension.[27] Anshu Sur, for example, described how Direct Action Day violence in his hometown Noakhali was driven by existing tension between the Hindu and Muslim communities, because the Hindu elite in Sur's village had previously discriminated against Muslim fishermen.[28] During Direct Action Day, Muslims attacked Hindus, burning their houses, butchering their families, and abducting women until all the Hindus in Sur's village had been driven out.[29]

Despite the objective failure of these various movements for Indian independence, in March 1947 Louis Mountbatten became the last British Viceroy of India, intending to formally orchestrate an end to the era of British rule.[30] Having lost power and status as a result of the Second World War, Britain could no longer maintain effective control over India, especially with demands for Indian independence swelling with time.[31] This decision was actively encouraged by American statesmen, who feared that prolonged British rule in India would radicalize Indians and make them susceptible to communist propaganda.[32]

---

[26] Tharoor, *Nehru: The Invention of India*, Pages 145 – 146.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Oral history with Anshu Sur. *Oral History with Anshu Sur*. The 1947 Partition Archive, December 6, 2014. Cited hereafter as "Anshu Sur, 2014."
[29] Anshu Sur, 2014.
[30] Manmath Nath Das. *Partition and Independence of India: Inside Story of the Mountbatten Days*. Vision Books, 1982. Page 17. Cited hereafter as "Das, *Partition and Independence of India*, Page #."; Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page 4.
[31] Moonis, Page 47.
[32] B Z Khasru. "Hindus-Muslim Clash 72 Years after Britain Left India." History News Network. The George Washington University, September 8, 2019. Cited hereafter as "Khasru, 2019."

Making plans to exit India by June 1947, Mountbatten worked with Congress and the League to guide India towards independence.[33] The League, on grounds of the Two-Nation Theory, rejected initial plans for an independent, unified India, and instead different plans to divide India on a religious basis were introduced.[34]

The environment surrounding the events leading up to the Partition are heavily saturated with the colonial legacy of British rulers' "divide and conquer" policy regarding South Asia's Hindu and Muslim populations. Oral histories of multiple Partition survivors recall harmonious or, at least, civil relations between Hindus and Muslims before the Partition, and frequently express shock at how violently and suddenly tensions between these two populations led to the brutal, savage deaths of millions. In the context of South Asian history and British colonial rule, however, Partition violence represented centuries of the British manipulating the fears and insecurities of the two populations, playing at their anxieties to ensure that they would be too distracted with each other to destabilize British rule too much, all at a cost of millions and millions of lives when these fears exploded into political and violent catastrophes with widespread international implications.

Britain ceded colonial rule on August 14, 1947, and the two independent states of India and Pakistan came into existence. Nehru and Jinnah became Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, respectively. The Partition serves as a painful, tearful marker of two states' entry into the international system as independent states.

[33] Collins and Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight*, Pages 64 – 65.
[34] Khasru, 2019.; Das, *Partition and Independence of India*, Page 19.

CHAPTER 3

WHAT WAS THE PARTITION OF INDIA?

The Partition was a massive population movement where Muslims moved north or east to Pakistan, and Hindus and other non-Muslims moved south or west to India.[35] On paper, it appeared as a simple migration, but the reality was horrifically violent, where upwards of two million people – men, women, and children – were murdered and upwards of fourteen million people were further displaced and made refugees.[36] Survivors recall images of intense violence, of limbs that were hacked off one by one inside burning hot trains, of strangers and friends alike breaking into homes and stabbing occupants to death, of being kidnapped and tortured just to hurt the wider community one belonged to. Ajit Cour, a Hindu woman originally from Lahore, remembered a man beaten and set on fire while his attackers danced around him, celebrating the murder.[37] The memory demonstrated both what Cour perceived as "a very deep-rooted brutal, brutal, enjoyment of killing" and the dark, excessive nature of Partition violence.[38] The feverish, frenzied violence that erupted after the publication of the Radcliffe Line, which was published just *two days* after independence was declared, was rooted around a combination of gender or religion-based motivations. Partition violence ultimately resulted in a sprawling,

[35] Steven Brocklehurst. "Partition of India: 'They Would Have Slaughtered Us'." BBC News. BBC News, August 12, 2017. Cited hereafter as "Brocklehurst, 2017."
[36] Brocklehurst, 2017.
[37] Oral history with Ajit Cour. *Oral History with Ajit Cour*. The 1947 Partition Archive, November 2, 2010. Cited hereafter as "Ajit Cour, 2010."
[38] Ajit Cour, 2010.

catastrophic refugee crisis and an acute environment of suspicion and hostility that even today cloaks Indo-Pakistani relations and shapes designs of national identity.

The actual line that divided India is called the "Radcliffe Line," and is regarded by survivors with the same morbid apprehension usually afforded to surgical scars, and to a certain degree, the Line genuinely was a clinical incision, made by pen instead of a scalpel.[39] The Line is named after Cyril Radcliffe, the lawyer who the British government tasked with dividing India into India and Pakistan. Radcliffe had never traveled to India before and had little knowledge of India's economy, landscape, or people. He was instructed to divide the nation in accordance with the Two-Nation Theory, on the basis of religion rather than geography, politics, or the wishes of the people themselves. Provinces with a Muslim majority would be included in Muslim majority Pakistan, while provinces with a Hindu or non-Muslim majority would be included in secular India.[40] For example, the Montgomery District in Punjab was included within Pakistan's borders because of its sixty-nine percent Muslim population.[41] Amritsar, with fifty-nine percent of its population Hindu or Sikh, was included within India's borders.[42] This method of division led to religious, cultural, and economic locations being split irrationally between India and Pakistan.[43] Massanian, a village in Punjab, for example, had once held a small but dedicated Muslim community with multiple religious and cultural sites including mosques, shrines, and burial grounds.[44] The Line included Massanian in India, but the Muslim

[39] Joya Chatterji. "The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape, 1947-52." *Modern Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (1999): 185-242. Page 185. Cited hereafter as "Chatterji, Page #."
[40] Qazi Shakil Ahmad. "The Partition Plan, Indian Design and the Kashmir Issue." *Pakistan Horizon* 56, no. 2 (2003): 17-35. Page 27 – 28. Cited hereafter as "Shakil Ahmad, page #."; Chatterji, Page 186.
[41] Vox. "How this border transformed a subcontinent | India & Pakistan." *YouTube* video, 17:20. June 26, 2019. Cited hereafter as "Vox, 2019."
[42] Vox, 2019.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

community was forced to move to Pakistan.[45] Radcliffe spent five weeks dividing India in this fashion, by population numbers and percentages, according to religion, and then left India.[46] He did not witness the massive violence that unfolded after his borders were published, and he never visited India again.[47]



Figure 3.1: Radcliffe Line[48]

Publication of the Radcliffe Line was met with great confusion in India. According to Pushpinder Singh Chopra, a Sikh man, no one knew where the line was at the time of its

[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Google Maps, 2019.

publication.[49] Chopra's hometown, Amritsar, was suddenly a city close to the Indo-Pakistani border, and he recalled that troops had marched in to uphold the border only to be struck by the question of *where is the border*?[50] "There was no border," Chopra said. "The Radcliffe Line they drew was only on paper, there was no river, there was no hill, there was no feature [to identify the border] that [supposedly cut through] houses, through villages."[51] Nirmal Bakshi, a Hindu woman, echoed this sentiment in memories of her family assuming that their hometown, Mirpur, would be included within India's borders.[52] "Bur Mirpur went to Pakistan," Bakshi said. "The whole city started migrating and people got lost in the chaos."[53] Birinder Pal Singh Cheema's Sikh family had also assumed that there would be no need to leave their homes in Punjab, though they were simply unconcerned about where the border would place their home. A week after the Partition was announced however, rumors of an imminent attack on their home forced them to flee out of fear.[54] These experiences all demonstrate how the Line added fear and confusion to existing tensions, ultimately resulting in mass disorder and increased violence in the forms of raids, murders, and rapes.[55]

Provinces were unsure of what state they now belonged to and communities where multiple religions that had co-existed for centuries, like the previously mentioned Massanian, were now divided. Punjab's vibrant Sikh community was violently torn apart

[49] Pushpinder Singh Chopra. *Pushpinder Singh Chopra*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019. Cited hereafter as "Pushpinder Singh Chopra, 2019."
[50] Pushpinder Singh Chopra, 2019.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Nirmal Bakshi. *Nirmal Bakshi*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 8, 2018. Cited hereafter as "Nirmal Bakshi, 2018."
[53] Nirmal Bakshi, 2018.
[54] Oral history with Birinder Pal Singh Cheema. *Oral History with Birinder Pal Singh Cheema*. The 1947 Partition Archive, October 4, 2015. Cited hereafter as "Birinder Pal Singh Cheema, 2015."
[55] Pushpinder Singh Chopra, 2019.

because the Line had cut through the heart of their community and forced Sikhs to leave what was now Pakistan's Punjab for India's Punjab.[56] Some provinces and communities never discovered which state they would go to. Kashmir, for example, was ruled by Hindus, but its population was largely Muslim.[57] It was divided, like Punjab, but a final border between India and Pakistan was never negotiated or respected, leaving Kashmir locked in conflict for decades and its people in turmoil.[58]

Religion, religious differences, and the idea of religion-based nationality all sparked the idea of Partition itself and during the actual Partition these issues or challenges all contributed or inspired most, if not all, the violence that occurred. Horrific violence was committed to demonstrate the superiority and power of one group over the other. Jaidev Hunna recalled how his family took refuge in a college during the Partition and were discovered by Muslims.[59] Anticipating protection from the Muslims, the family members eagerly revealed themselves, only to be shot at by the Muslims because they were Hindus.[60] Salim Ahmed, a different survivor, recalled groups of Hindus peeling passengers off trains at train stations and stabbing them all, even little children, with shouts of *Muslim! Muslim! Muslim!*[61] Both experiences demonstrate how religion was a critical factor that motivated Partition violence and disorder.

Hindu-Muslim tensions had been escalating violently even before the Partition. As mentioned previously, the British had deliberately encouraged discord between Hindus and

---

[56] Chaudhry Muhammad Ali. *The Emergence of Pakistan*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1967. Page 156. Cited hereafter as "Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Page #."
[57] Hugh Tinker. "Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab, August 1947." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (1977): 695-704. Page 695. Cited hereafter as "Tinker, Page #."
[58] Tinker, Page 695.
[59] Brocklehurst, 2017.
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.

Muslims. The Quit India and Direct Action Day movements had failed because instead of attempting to resolve the discord with dialogue, activists ignored or simply moved past it. However, even with this discord, most survivors of the Partition stress that Hindu-Muslim relations prior to the Partition were positive and peaceful. Surinder Singh Gandhi, one survivor, stated that in Quetta, "there was total absence of any ill feelings between the [Hindu and Muslim] communities until the Partition took place."[62] Chhote Lal Bharany echoed his sentiment, recalling that "there was no difference between the [Hindu and Muslim communities]."[63] Zeba Rizvi, another survivor, firmly stated that religion had only served as a reminder to love others, while Bimla Goulatia recalled not even knowing who or what Muslims were, and asking her mother during the Partition, "Who are these 'Muslims?'"[64] This narrative is supported by numerous instances of Hindus helping Muslims and vice versa. Minna Kapoor, a Hindu woman, recalled how her family hid a young Muslim boy at their home.[65] "The neighbors were terrible, [...] [they] said they would kill [the boy]," Kapoor remembered and described how the family kept the boy safe, risking their own lives for him.[66]

Despite these narratives of kindness and warmth, Hindu-Muslim relations during the Partition *were* largely violent and a product of the discord that the British had sewn into their relationship. Hindus and Muslims would target each other during the Partition in

[62] Surinder Singh Gandhi. *Surinder Singh Gandhi*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, June 27, 2018. Cited hereafter as "Surinder Singh Gandhi, 2018."
[63] Chhote Lal Bharany. *Chhote Lal Bharany*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 6, 2018. Cited hereafter as "Chhote Lal Bahrany, 2018."
[64] Oral history with Zeba Rizvi. *Oral History with Zeba Rizvi*. The 1947 Partition Archive, December 17, 2015. Cited hereafter as "Zeba Rizvi, 2015."; Bimla Goulatia. "A Child's Horrifying Memories of India's Partition." India of the Past: Preserving memories of India and Indians. India Of the Past, 2012.
[65] Minna Kapoor. *Minna Kapoor*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019. Cited hereafter as "Minna Kapoor, 2019."
[66] Minna Kapoor, 2019.

reaction to perceived security threats posed by the mere existence of the other. Anita Rani's ancestral Hindu family, for example, were residents of a mostly-Muslim village.[67] When the Partition occurred, the Muslims gathered the Hindus, Sikhs, and other non-Muslims together and murdered them.[68] Rani did not discover the Muslims' motivations for the massacre, though it can be assumed that, similar to other instances, Muslims had made what they perceived to be the rational decision to eliminate all potential threats to their security as a mostly-Muslim village.

Beyond these religious-based motives, Partition violence was also fueled by gender-based motives. Specific instances of violence driven by gender are indicative of the rapid, chaotic change society underwent *during* the Partition itself. Tying directly into religious-based motivations, women were targeted by religious groups (eg, Muslims would target Hindu women, Hindus would target Muslim women) and systematically raped, murdered, or kidnapped, forced to convert to other religions and, sometimes, even forced into marriages with their kidnappers.[69] The violence inflicted on a woman's body was less of a personal attack on the woman than a broader attack on the men who shared the same religion as the woman.[70] This is because rape and sexual assault against women were viewed as acts of religious supremacy and dominance.[71] Upwards of a hundred thousand women were kidnapped and raped during the Partition, and these women were viewed as "stolen" because they had been deliberately taken from their groups with the intent of

[67] My Family, Partition and Me: India 1947. *My Family, Partition and Me: India 1947*. BBC, August 9, 2017. Cited hereafter as "BBC, 2017."
[68] BBC, 2017.
[69] Arunima Dey. "Violence Against Women During the Partition of India: Interpreting Women and Their Bodies in the Context of Ethnic Genocide." *Spanish Journal of English Studies*, no. 37 (2016). Page 106. Cited hereafter as "Dey, Page #."
[70] Dey, Page 107.
[71] Ibid.

weakening the other group.[72] Women lost their lives, identities, or both during the Partition, their bodies transformed into easy cultural objects to target, dismember, mutilate, and destroy in attempts to dishonor and shame a community.[73]

Stolen women had little hope of returning to their families and homes because South Asian culture holds specific ideas of honor and shame, and love for women is conditional and dependent on their ability to exhibit sexual modesty.[74] Feminine honor centers around sexual shame and appropriate behavior for women, while masculine honor entailed men ensuring that his female family member's honor was upheld and protected.[75] Therefore, when women were raped, or stolen away, they lost their "purity" and tainted the family's honor and status. During the Partition, stolen women could choose to either live with their abductors, commit suicide, or return home and risk being killed by male family members for having shamed their families by becoming polluted and defiled.[76] Many women, in the aftermath of the Partition, ultimately choose to stay with their abductors and rapists instead of returning to their families.[77] This not only ensured that they would survive, but also that they could raise any children born since their abduction.[78]

During the Partition, men would take measures to uphold family honor and protect their female family members from being raped, murdered, or stolen.[79] Men would either

---

[72] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Pages 2 – 3.
[73] Bhujendra Singh L R Rathod. "Women in Partition: A Feminist Reading." In *Reminiscences of Partition*, 237. Shimoga: Kuvempu University, 2010. Cited hereafter as "Rathod, Page #.".
[74] Nasreen Mansoor. "The Concept of Honour and Shame for South Asian British Muslim Men and Women." In *Therapy, Culture and Spirituality*, 56–69. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
[75] Hira Batool Jafri. "Female Falcons: An Exploration of Feminine Honor in South Asian Communities." 2014. Masters Theses. 64. Cited hereafter as "Jafri, 2014."
[76] Rathod, Pages 215–63.; Dey, 112.
[77] Pippa Virdee. "Remembering Partition: Women, Oral Histories and the Partition of 1947." *Oral History* 41, no. 2 (2013): 49-62. Page 55. Cited hereafter as "Virdee, Page #."
[78] Virdee, Page 55.
[79] Jafri, 2014.

murder their female family members (often en masse) or otherwise instruct them to commit suicide, often through immolation.[80] Amol Swani, a Hindu woman, fearfully recounted how, in reaction to news of Muslim men attacking Hindu women, her father gave her mother a can of petrol, matches, and instructions to burn herself and Swani in the event that Muslim men invaded their home.[81] "'Don't let yourselves fall into Muslim hands,'" Swani recalled her father telling them.[82] Her mother gravely seemed to accept this fate, but Swani had been horrified, and she remembered asking repeatedly, "how could we kill ourselves?"[83]

Just as religious-based motives fueled gender-based motives for violence, the refugee crisis during and in the immediate aftermath of the Partition was made worse by Hindu-Muslim tensions. Religion-based Partition violence underlined poor allotment of resources to refugees. Shobha Nehru, a woman who helped facilitate migrations of refugees, recalled one instance where a Hindu man refused to sell buckets to Muslim refugees because of the violence Muslims had committed against Hindus in Punjab.[84] Nehru's experience is only one example of individuals selectively choosing who to help, or not, recover on basis of religion and leftover pain from religion-based Partition violence. Hindus would seek out to help fellow Hindus while ignoring or scorning Muslims, and Muslims, in turn, would seek out fellow Muslims while ignoring or scoring Hindus.

Aside from religious-based motivations, the refugee crisis was made worse by sheer government ineptitude and mismanagement. Communal violence, gross sickness and

[80] Ibid.
[81] Amol Swani. *Amol Swani*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018. Cited hereafter as "Amol Swani, 2018."
[82] Amol Swani, 2018.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Oral history with Shobha Nehru. *Oral History with Shobha Nehru*. The 1947 Partition Archive, September 24, 2013.

hunger were rampant amongst refugees and in camps. Dillip Kumar Kanungo, a Hindu man, recalled refugees in Kolkata demanding India's Prime Minister Nehru to step in and take measures to curb violence and provide better, more humane treatment in refugee camps.[85] "'You did well in Punjab,'" Kanungo recalled a refugee saying. "'Why are you discriminating here [in Kolkata]?'"[86] Taj Begum, a Muslim woman, echoed this sentiment and spoke of refugee camps in Delhi, where food was poorly distributed and refugees were left roofless during periods of heavy rain.[87] Syed Nizam Shah, a Muslim man, discussed the ineptitude of the Pakistani government when it came to refugee camps.[88] "There were hundreds of men, women and children lying around the railway tracks across the slums to relieve themselves," Shah recounted.[89] "It was one of the most horrific sights of Partition that I could recall. The government paid no attention to that situation until the 1960s."[90] These experiences are all demonstrative of how the governments of both India and Pakistan failed to maintain order in their respective states during and immediately after the Partition.

[85] Dilip Kumar Kanungo. *Dilip Kumar Kanungo*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019. Cited hereafter as "Dilip Kumar Kanungo, 2019."
[86] Dilip Kumar Kanungo, 2019.
[87] Oral history with Taj Begum. *Oral History with Taj Begum*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 6, 2017. Cited hereafter as "Taj Begum, 2017."
[88] Oral history with Syed Nizam Shah. *Oral History with Syed Nizam Shah*. The 1947 Partition Archive, March 3, 2016. Cited hereafter as "Syed Nizam Shah, 2016."
[89] Syed Nizam Shah, 2016.
[90] Ibid.

Figure 3.2: Refugees on a Train[91]

The Partition was a deeply traumatic event in which millions lost their lives. Hindu-Muslim tensions underlined the entire event, but instead of placing blame for violence onto one group, most survivors expressed simple shock and dismay that the violence had occurred at all. Some survivors, like Yogesh Munjal, placed the blame on the Indian and Pakistani governments for their poor governance and management of the situation, arguing that loss of life could have been avoided if both governments had taken a more active role to prevent violence and ensure peaceful migrations.[92] Others, like Syed Nizam Shah, fully blamed and condemned the British for the tension built up between Hindus and Muslims months, decades, centuries prior to the Partition, and then leaving without a glance back

[91] Associated Press.
[92] Oral history with Yogesh Munjal. *Oral History with Yogesh Munjal*. The 1947 Partition Archive, September 10, 2016.

when the Partition dissolved into chaos.[93] Partition violence was an extension of the human costs incurred by the decision of statesmen to divide India, and both the Partition and its direct aftermath would shape society and culture, domestic and foreign policies, and national identities in both India and Pakistan.

[93] Syed Nizam Shah, 2016.

CHAPTER 4

EFFECTS ON SOCIETY AND CULTURE

To say that the violence and chaos left behind by the Partition was unsettling is an understatement. Partition violence deeply rattled South Asians because they had all been subjects and perpetrators of dark, disturbing acts of violence. Some had been hacked to death by people with whom they had once shared close friendships. Some had *been* the ones to stab their close friends and family to death. Some had murdered the women in their families before they would have been violated and dishonored. Some had *been* the women doused in gasoline by family members and set alight. Some, like Ali Shan, were only six years old when mobs killed every member of their community right in front of their eyes, leaving them orphaned, traumatized refugees.[94] Some, like Mohindra Dhall and Shobha Nehru, had watched trains teeming with their friends and family peel away from stations and learn later that the occupants on the train had all been brutally butchered.[95] In the aftermath, Sushiri Motial, one survivor, recalled how her friend's mother went mad, overwhelmed by all that she experienced, and ate coal.[96] Vilayat Khan, another survivor, stated he was unable to smile even once for two years after the Partition.[97] The experiences of both Khan and Motial demonstrate how it was painfully difficult for South Asians, at

[94] Oral history with Ali Shan. *Oral History with Ali Shan*. The 1947 Partition Archive, August 21, 2011.
[95] Brocklehurst, 2017.; Shobha Nehru, 2013.
[96] Oral history with Sushiri Motial. *Oral History with Sushiri Motial*. The 1947 Partition Archive, November 13, 2013. Cited hereafter as "Sushiri Motial, 2013."
[97] Oral history with Vilayat Khan. *Oral History with Vilayat Khan*. The 1947 Partition Archive, April 28, 2013.

the individual level, to recover from the Partition, after witnessing and experiencing violence at such a large scale and at such young ages.

The Partition was a deeply traumatic event that produced a host of interconnected socio-cultural problems for Indian and Pakistani statesmen, including a massive refugee crisis, continued violence and increasingly strained relations between Hindus and Muslims, complications in family separations and reunions during and after the Partition, and economic concerns. South Asians' collective memory of the Partition is defined by the ugly, brutal violence between Hindus and Muslims. The Partition was, above all, a matter of population migration, and people struggled to cope with massive numbers of community members simply *gone*, dead by their own hands or others, or miles away in what was now a hostile state. Both Indian and Pakistani statesmen relied on nationalism in their attempts to resolve these problems because, simply, nationalism encourages unity, which produces strength, which creates the resolve to overcome tragedy. Indian and Pakistani statesmen attempted to build their national identities and developed their interests around lingering pain from the Partition, but both new states failed to adequately respond to, resolve, and recover from problems in the aftermath of the Partition.[98]

Migration and violence during the Partition destabilized communities and infrastructures and directly established the post-Partition existence of refugees as a major domestic crisis for both India and Pakistan. Families who migrated would arrive in India or Pakistan and, unless they had the wealth or connections to secure housing immediately, would huddle, anxious and traumatized, in refugee camps, where disease and social

[98] Bal Ram Nanda. *Witness to Partition: A Memoir*. Rupa & Company, 1948. Page 97. Cited hereafter as "Nanda, *Witness to Partition*, Page #."

disorder erupted in the unsanitary environments.[99] Indian and Pakistani statesmen both scrambled to rehabilitate refugees and quickly integrate them into both society and the economy, but both states failed to genuinely grasp and resolve the refugee crisis effectively and efficiently.[100] Neither state received assistance from Europe or the Red Cross, with Europeans still focused on solving their own refugee crises from the Second World War and the latter viewing South Asia's crisis as beyond its scope and capabilities.[101] Ultimately, the refugee crisis would continue unresolved and forgotten by both Indian and Pakistani statesmen, with all their attempts to rehabilitate refugees only strengthening the existing middle class and increasing the gap between the wealthy and poor, instead of lifting refugees out of poverty.[102]

Beyond poor living conditions, refugee camps were, for the people, new and unfamiliar environments, with different languages and cultural practices, and it was difficult for people to find any semblance of security or comfort in the camps. Refugees struggled to recover from the shock of experiencing Partition violence, move on from memories of their old homes and lives, and integrate into their new social, cultural, and economic contexts. These tasks are inherently challengingly, but refugees further struggled to find a sense of belonging and security in their new homes because communities were unwilling to accept and absorb the refugees, often on the basis of ethnicity or language. Manika Banerjee's Hindu's family, for example, had left East Bengal in Pakistan for West Bengal in India during the Partition, but upon arrival, the family quickly realized that West

[99] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page 164.
[100] Ibid., Pages 168 – 169.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid., Pages 172 to 173.

Bengalis were not welcoming despite sharing the same Hindu faith.[103] Banerjee, then a child, was tormented by West Bengali children for her accent and was routinely called a "bangal," an ethno-geographic slur directed towards East Bengalis.[104] This experience is echoed by Nand Lal Jain, a Hindu man, who recalled Punjabi refugees in Amritsar continually being othered and labeled as refugees by native Amritsaris despite the Punjabis' efforts to assimilate and remove their accent.[105] Sher Singh Kukkal had a similar experience when his Hindu family left West Punjab in Pakistan for Gorakhpur in India and Kukkal struggled to adjust in school because he had learned Urdu instead of Hindi.[106] These experiences all demonstrate the immediate and long term struggles refugees had faced while attempting to start new lives in their new homes.

Inadequate government and social response to the refugee crisis worsened the situation and kept refugees in a state of extreme poverty and insecurity. Both Indian and Pakistani statesmen were unable to provide immediate improvements or basic resources at refugee camps, leading to existing unsanitary conditions to fester and grow violent with time. Muhammad Yousef, a Muslim man, recalled that food provided to refugees to in Ganda Singh by locals had been poisoned, leading to the intentional deaths of many refugees, their corpses reportedly "piled as high as houses on the side of the road."[107] According to Yousef, the Pakistani government's failure to provide shelter or vaccination further led to rain and cholera killing even *more* refugees.[108] Dilip Kumar Kanungo, a

[103] Oral history with Manika Banerjee. *Oral History with Manika Banerjee*. The 1947 Partition Archive, July 25, 2016. Cited hereafter as "Manika Banerjee, 2016."
[104] Manika Banerjee, 2016
[105] Nand Lal Jain. *Nand Lal Jain*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 6, 2018.
[106] Oral history with Sher Singh Kukkal. *Oral History with Sher Singh Kukkal*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 6, 2014.
[107] Oral history with Muhammad Yousuf. *Oral History with Muhammad Yousuf*. The 1947 Partition Archive, May 12, 2016. Cited hereafter as "Muhammad Yousef, 2016."
[108] Muhammad Yousef, 2016.

Hindu man, recalled violence breaking out in West Bengal's refugee campus and the Indian government failing to respond and halt said violence.[109] Ashoka Gupta, a Hindu woman, echoed Kanungo and stated that her attempts to provide adequate sanitation, shelter, nutrition, and general security for refugees in West Bengal failed due to lack of governmental and social support.[110] These experiences all demonstrate represent failure, at the governmental and social level, to integrate and provide security for refugees.

Indian and Pakistani statesmen both also failed to address and manage violence between the Hindu and Muslim communities. Despite the assumption of the Two-Nation Theory having been that tensions between Hindus and Muslims would decrease with separate states, tensions between the Hindu-Muslim communities had only worsened in the aftermath of the Partition. Many people, like Sushiri Motial, were alarmed by the increase in and escalation of communal violence.[111] Religious persecution motivated families to migrate well after the Partition, as those families that had initially attempted to remain in their homelands were driven out by other religious groups. As Shobha Nehru, a Hindu woman, argued, dividing India's religious diversity into two states had only opened the door for more religious-based violence and aggression.[112] "On one side they talk about Hindus," Nehru said, "and on the other, they talk about Muslims," and, ultimately, the ability to have productive dialogue and resolve Hindu-Muslim tensions became increasingly limited with time and separation.[113] Partition violence saw Hindus and Muslims both commit horrific atrocities against each other, and dividing the two social

[109] Dilip Kumar Kanungo, 2019.
[110] Narayani Gupta, and Sarmistha Dutta Gupta, eds. *A Fighting Spirit: Selected Writings of Ashoka Gupta*. Niyogi Books, 2012. Pages 101, 109.
[111] Sushiri Motial, 2013.
[112] Shobha Nehru, 2013.
[113] Ibid.

groups into different, hostile states led by statesmen used the pain between the two groups to construct and legitimize their national identities prevented opportunities for recovery and reconciliation.[114]

Religious persecution had grown more intense during and after the Partition, and in multiple instances continued religious persecution was the primary motivation for refugees to abandon their homes and seek out different homes elsewhere. Ila Banerjee's Hindu family, for example, only left East Pakistan for Mymensingh in India when it became clear that East Pakistan had grown too hostile and unsafe for Hindus.[115] Targeted incidents of arson and stabbing against Hindus by Muslims created an environment of fear and suspicion, with offers of protection from Muslims being regarded warily because there was virtually no way of knowing if that offer was a genuine attempt to help or a veiled threat that was meant to lure Hindus into danger.[116] The experiences of Banerjee's family are not unique, especially for other Bengali Hindus in East Pakistan. While most Bengali Hindus had stayed in East Pakistan during the Partition, they would leave for India after the Partition because of "[fears] of violence, harassment, and a loss in status" in East Pakistan.[117] Historically, under British rule, Bengali Hindus had held high social status in East Pakistan. Under Pakistani rule, however, their positions and social statuses were stripped away, and continued religious persecution led multiple Bengali Hindus to leave for India post-Partition. They commented that while "our bodies are in Pakistan[,] [...] our souls are in India," referring directly to the larger, safer Hindu community in India.[118]

---

[114] Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Pages 272 – 273.
[115] Ila Banerjee. *Ila Banerjee*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018. Cited hereafter as "Ila Banerjee, 2018."
[116] Ila Banerjee, 2018.
[117] Gautam Ghosh. ""God Is A Refugee": Nationality, Morality and History in the 1947 Partition of India." *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 42, no. 1 (1998): 33-62. Page 33.
[118] Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Page 271.

The assassination of Gandhi, a prominent social activist and leader during the Indian independence movement, in January 1948 further stoked Hindu-Muslim tensions. The killer had not been immediately identified when news of Gandhi's death broke out, leading many to assume the killer must have been a Muslim.[119] Shahryar Khan, a Muslim boy who had been attending boarding school in India at the time, recalled how this speculation immediately arose Hindu-Muslim tensions in India.[120] Khan's mother, fearing the worst should Gandhi's assassin be formally identified as a Muslim, drove to Khan's boarding school and insisted on collecting not only Khan but all the other Muslim boys in the school for their safety and protection.[121] These fears and tensions did not immediately dissipate when the killer proved to be a Hindu, and the experience as a whole demonstrates how deeply rattled Hindu-Muslim relations were in the aftermath of the Partition.

Maryam Babar's post-Partition childhood provides a simple but succinct demonstration of how the Partition damaged Hindu-Muslim relations, directly building off of the tensions the British had encouraged between the two social groups.[122] Babar and her cousins had played Pakistanis versus Indians, a game modeled after American children playing Cowboys and Indians, and none of the children wanted to be Pakistanis, because the Pakistanis were "bad."[123] Babar did not question the implications of this game as a child, but, essentially, what were previously referred to as tensions between two social groups, Hindus and Muslims, were now tensions between two *states*, India and Pakistan.[124]

---

[119] Oral history with Shaharyar Khan. *Oral History with Shaharyar Khan*. The 1947 Partition Archive, May 31, 2016. Cited hereafter as "Shaharyar Khan, 2016."
[120] Shaharyar Khan, 2016.
[121] Ibid.
[122] Oral history with Maryam Babar. *Oral History with Maryam Babar*. The 1947 Partition Archive, November 18, 2018. Cited hereafter as "Maryam Babar, 2018."
[123] Maryam Babar, 2018.
[124] Ibid.

This development proved problematic because it escalated tensions by firmly framing the conflict as one between two states both capable and willing to go to war.

Stemming directly from Hindu-Muslim tensions during and after the Partition, women were disproportionately and violently affected by the Partition. As explained previously, women had become victims of targeted murder, rape, and kidnapping during the Partition because women functioned as symbols of honor and purity in South Asian culture. Violence targeted against women's bodies were an effective method of demonstrating religious supremacy and dominance, and the violence was a direct insult to the honor and manhood of women's male kin. During the Partition, there were multiple instances of women watching their husbands murdered in front of them before they themselves were raped by and forced to marry their husband's killer.[125] After the Partition, talking about the brutal violence they had experienced during the Partition could have been cathartic and healing for women, but social taboos prevented women from discussing their experiences.[126] This created an intense, suffocating silence where Partition violence was either ignored or the victims were viewed with disgust, as women's purity had been violated and their family honor tarnished.[127]

Both Indian and Pakistani statesmen attempted to restore and return stolen women, but these attempts were marred by uncertain numbers of exactly how many women *were* stolen and by Hindu-Muslim tensions that underlined the Indo-Pakistani rivalry and subsequently prevented effective communication and cooperation between the two states.

---

[125] Anuparna Mukherjee. "Reading Women's Journey through the Debris of Indian Partition in the "Charnel Ground of History"." *Rocky Mountain Review* 66 (2012): 93-105. Page 94.
[126] Rabia Umar Ali. "Muslim Women and the Partition of India: A Historiographical Silence." *Islamic Studies* 48, no. 3 (2009): 425-36. Page 428. Cited hereafter as "Umar Ali, Page #."
[127] Umar Ali, Page 428.

These stolen women were extremely reluctant to return home to their families, as they had established new lives for themselves with their captors. Often, they had children born from their abduction and were further reluctant to leave because neither their families nor the government offered protection and support for the children. Both governments' refusal to resolve these crimes with respect to these women proved fatal for families and communities at large, ultimately resulting in scores of children being abandoned by their forcibly repatriated mothers and adding to the existing refugee crisis that was already poorly managed.[128]

Khalida Ghousia Akhtar, a Muslim woman, recounted the experiences of her daughter, who had been kidnapped and forcibly married to a Hindu man in the midst of the Partition.[129] When Akhtar found her daughter after the Partition, the daughter was reluctant to return home because she had adopted Hinduism, had children, and feared shame and discrimination in Pakistan.[130] Akhtar and her husband convinced their daughter to come to Pakistan with her family, including her husband, but the daughter and her family never settled in Pakistan.[131] Pakistanis viewed them with suspicion due to their Hindu ties and previous residency in India, and they never fully integrated into Pakistani society.[132] Akhtar's experiences demonstrate the complex issues surrounding stolen women, and how initial acts of violence during the Partition oftentimes produced irreversible damage to women, their families, and their communities at large.

[128] Virdee, Page 53.
[129] Oral history with Khalida Ghousia Akhtar. *Oral History with Khalida Ghousia Akhtar*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 25, 2016. Cited hereafter as "Khalida Ghosia Akhtar, 2016."
[130] Khalida Ghosia Akhtar, 2016.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.

Both Indian and Pakistani statesmen faced similar but fundamentally different economic concerns in the aftermath of the Partition, especially in direct relation to the refugee crisis. India had an established industrialized economy with a strong business community, and concerns revolved around integrating refugees into the workforce without damaging the economy or creating societal discord. Naseem Mirza Changezi, for example, recalled the direct threat refugees posed to Indian businesses.[133] Refugees in Old Delhi would often set up stalls in front of established stores, and sell the same products for half the price as the established store.[134] This created tension between refugees and Old Delhi natives.[135] Changezi's experiences are one example of social rejection to the economic integration of refugees post-Partition in India, with that social rejection rooted around the idea that refugees were taking away jobs and profits from established Indian businesses.

Pakistan, in contrast, was less technologically advanced compared to India and had a more primitive, agriculture-reliant economy.[136] Hindus and Sikhs had originally made up the bulk of Pakistan's trading class as owners of cattle and grain, respectively, but both groups left for India.[137] Bal Ram Nanda, a Hindu man, recalled that the Partition forced Pakistan's Muslims to assume control of stores and factories previously that had been left for Hindus and Sikhs to operate.[138] The Partition forced Muslims to venture into business in order to save Pakistan's economy, permanently changing socio-cultural dynamics and traditions in Pakistan. Indian statesmen, in contrast, were concerned primarily with ensuring local economies could maintain and support the integration of refugees.

---

[133] Oral history with Naseem Mirza Changezi. *Oral History with Naseem Mirza Changezi*. The 1947 Partition Archive, October 23, 2016. Cited hereafter as "Naseem Mirza Changezi, 2016."
[134] Naseem Mirza Changezi, 2016.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Page 337.
[137] Ibid., Page 262.
[138] Nanda, *Witness to Partition*, Page 71.

Both Indian and Pakistani statesmen relied on nationalism as a tool to divert attention away from post-Partition concerns and to resolve post-Partition concerns. In both states, national identity and interests were constructed around the pain of Partition, around paranoid perceptions statesmen held of the others, especially in regards to strength, security, and intentions, and all against the backdrop of Hindu-Muslim tensions that pre-dated Partition violence.[139] Pakistani nationalism, for example, was rooted around the basic principles of the Two-Nation Theory, that despite differences in ethnicity and language, South Asian Muslims were united by virtue of faith in Islam and needed Pakistan as a homeland.[140] Nationalism was used to overcome anxieties regarding the economic stability and political integrity of Pakistan, especially to the perceived threat of Hindu majoritarianism that predated the Partition.[141] Pakistan's usage of nationalism as a tool to unify and heal however, was ineffective due to the persistence of ethnic and linguistic differences in Pakistan. These differences were most prominent in East Pakistan, where Bengalis were continually denied political representation and acknowledgment from the Pakistani government, which was centralized in West Pakistan, on the basis of both ethnic and linguistic differences between Bengalis and Urdu-speaking Muslims in Pakistan.

Pakistani nationalism failed to genuinely resolve any issues because Pakistan's government simply lacked a stable foundation for governing.[142] The All-India Muslim League that had fought for Pakistan's existence during the Indian independence movement had always been unorganized and chaotic and that had carried over when it operated as the

[139] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page 183.
[140] Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, Page 364.
[141] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page 184.; Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Page 155.
[142] Samuel Martin Burke. *Mainsprings of Indian And Pakistani Foreign Policies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1975. Page 117. Cited hereafter as "Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian And Pakistani Foreign Policies*, Page #."

Pakistani government.[143] Additionally, Pakistan's Prime Minister and spiritual founder, Jinnah, died in 1948, which further robbed Pakistan of the solid leadership that it desperately needed to be stable.[144]

Indian statesmen, in contrast, were more effective in using nationalism as a tool to create a stable society, but unlike Pakistan where ethnic or linguistic nationalism trumped religious, state-based nationalism, India risked the rise of radical Hindu nationalism in the aftermath of the Partition.[145] Indian national identity heavily emphasized and celebrated concepts of secularism, plurality, and diversity.[146] As its Prime Minister, Nehru, did not die a year after the Partition, and it had a stable, organized foundation for government through Congress, and Indian nationalism was much more successful in drawing attention away from social issues and promoting a unified national identity.[147] Mismanagement of the refugee crisis however, led political groups and leaders to exploit the crisis and use refugees to cultivate loyal bases from themselves.[148] This further led to pockets of refugees in each state adopting hardline ideological views that translated to religion-based nationalism.[149] Some Hindu refugees in India, for example, came to develop nationalist views and see their secular government as catering to religious minorities, especially Muslims, as a result of Indian mismanagement of refugee camps.[150]

The lack of integration and of refugees is indicative of the flaws of the Two-Nation Theory and religious-based nationalism, in that both concepts ignored the social

[143] Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian And Pakistani Foreign Policies*, Page 117.
[144] Ibid.
[145] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Pages 129, 134 – 135, 149.
[146] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page184.; Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Page 155.
[147] Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian And Pakistani Foreign Policies*, Page 117.
[148] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Pages 176 – 177.
[149] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Pages 129, 134 – 135, 149.
[150] Ibid.

discrimination incurred by ethnic and linguistic differences. People were dramatically affected by Partition violence, and both Indian and Pakistani statesmen failed to provide substantial and genuine assistance to its citizens. Hindu-Muslim tensions had been used to justify the Partition and explain the necessity of Pakistan's existence, but these tensions only worsened during and after the Partition, and opportunities to heal and move on from these tensions grow increasingly slim with time.

CHAPTER 5

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND PLACE IN THE COLD WAR

Indian and Pakistani statesmen constructed national identities and interests that reflected events that occurred before and during the Partition. The Partition directly shaped diplomatic relations and provided the basis for the two states' continued rivalry and animosity, especially in the time directly following the Partition, when the pain of the event was still fresh. In the early years, diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan were influenced by Hindu-Muslim tensions that the Partition, had only worsened.

Pakistan's national identity and interests were rooted around the Two-Nation Theory, a perceived need for a South Asian Muslim homeland and the assumption that religious identity would trump ethnic or linguistic identity.[151] That assumption was quickly proven false by the perseverance of ethnic and linguistic conflict in Pakistan, especially East Pakistan, directly after the Partition.[152] Pakistani statesmen failed to unify the populace around its Muslim identity because they had attempted to erase all other identifying marks in the process, and this was not popularly received.

India's national identity and interests, in contrast, were built upon democratic concepts. India's existence did not hinge on any specific religious identity, but Indian statesmen sought to promote and establish a secular and *unified* Indian identity that was

[151] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Page 131.
[152] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page 189.

inclusive of the rich religious, ethnic, and linguistic diversity apparent in India.[153] Indian statesmen were more effective than Pakistani statesmen, but Indian statesmen risked the rise of Hindu nationalism.

India and Pakistan first went to war against each other in October 1947, hardly a month after the Partition, over a piece of territory – Kashmir. The Radcliffe Line, at the time of publication, did not place Kashmir within either India or Pakistan's borders, instead giving Kashmiris the ability to decide their fate. Kashmir's Muslim-majority population made it likely that it would choose to join Pakistan, but Kashmir's Hindu leadership ultimately chose to join India instead. Pakistani statesmen protested this claim because should Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, peacefully join the secular but Hindu-majority India, Pakistan's entire reason for existence would be undermined.[154] Pakistan existed because of a perceived *need* for a South Asian homeland, that because according to the Two-Nation Theory, Muslims could not live safely if even the possibility of Hindu leadership existed.[155] If Kashmir joined India, then there was no reason for Pakistan to exist, even in theory.[156] Pakistan needed Kashmir to strengthen and justify its own national identity and purpose as a *Muslim* state.[157]

Indian statesmen similarly sought to claim Kashmir because Indian national identity was vested in the belief that despite differences in religion, ethnicity, and language, all Indians were Indians who could unify around a secular, democratic identity. This was the antithesis of the Two-Nation Theory, and instead reflected earlier visions of a unified

[153] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Pages 131 – 132.
[154] Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. *The Myth of Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969. Page 180. Cited hereafter as "Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, Page #."
[155] Bhutto, *The Myth of Independence*, Page 180.
[156] Ibid.
[157] Ibid.

Indian identity and nation, where Hindus, Muslims, and all other religions could coexist peacefully. Should Kashmir be claimed and controlled by Pakistan, India's democratic principles would be undermined, and the Two-Nation Theory would not only be proven correct, it would be proven *necessary* – it would signal that a unified Indian identity and nation truly could not exist. Ultimately Kashmiris like Syed Nizam Shah argued that Kashmir was – and still is – a victim of two nationalist ideologies that refused to compromise. Kashmiris were subsequently left stateless.[158] The psychological ruptures caused by the Partition undermined the potential for a peaceful resolution to Kashmir, creating a dangerous rivalry that only intensified with time.[159] At its core, Kashmir was an emotional issue that resulted from lingering pain leftover from the Partition and a need to maintain national image and identity, domestically and abroad.

The Partition occurred during the early years of the Cold War, and the creation of India and Pakistan had a significant effect on international politics. The Cold War can be best understood as a period of geopolitical tension between the United States and the Soviet Union that was based around ideological conflicts as well as concepts of national security and regional interests that arose in the aftermath of the Second World War. Both the United States and the Soviets sought to secure alliances with various compatible states across the globe, and the economic, strategic, and political importance of South Asia as a region meant that the creation of India and Pakistan, no longer tied together with "British glue," did not go unnoticed by the United States and Soviet Union.[160]

---

[158] Oral history with Syed Nizam Shah. *Oral History with Syed Nizam Shah*. The 1947 Partition Archive, March 3, 2016.

[159] Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition*, Page 182.; Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Page 127.; Phillip Talbot. *An American Witness to India's Partition*. SAGE Publications India, 2007. Pages 342 – 345. Cited hereafter as "Philip Talbot, *An American Witness to India's Partition*, Page #."

[160] Philip Talbot, *An American Witness to India's Partition*, Page 341.

Pakistan entered a military alliance with the United States soon after the Partition, with Pakistani-American relations initially being built on complementary interests regarding the Soviet Union, whom they both viewed as a foreign threat due to Soviet promotion of communist ideology.[161] Pakistan was otherwise motivated to ally with the United States to gain access to American arms and military support. Pakistan sought to compensate for its weakness as a state, shore up its claims to Kashmir, and prepare for threats of "Indian aggression" and "Hindu imperialism," the latter threat directly threatening the broader Muslim world, not just Pakistan.[162]

In contrast, India and the United States did not form a similar alliance, largely because Prime Minister Nehru had established a neutral, non-aligned position that bothered the United States.[163] Nehru did not however, directly ally himself with the Soviet Union. He opted for a third option: join neither power bloc but still be a major player in global affairs.[164] Nehru refused to define Indian interests in terms of communism or anti-communism because both were irrelevant to his larger, broader goal of pan-Asian nationalism and regional dominance.[165]

---

[161] Shaheen Irshad Khan. *Rejection Alliance?: A Case-Study of U.S.-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1967*. American University of Beirut, 1972. Page 16. Cited hereafter as "Irshad Khan, *Rejection Alliance?*, Page #."; Russell Brines. *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*. Pall Mall Press, 1968. Page 104.; Robert J McMahon. *The Cold War on the Periphery*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994. Page 8.

[162] Talbot and Singh, *The Partition of India*, Page 163.; M S Venkataramani. *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947 to 1958*. Radiant Publishers, 1982. Page 1.; Irshad Khan, *Rejection Alliance?*, Page v.

[163] Anita Inder Singh. *The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship 1947–1956*. Pinter Publishers, 1993. Page 47.; Andrew Jon Rotter. *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964*. Cornell University Press, 2000. Page 45.

[164] S Mahmud Ali. *Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s*. Routledge, 1999. Page 13. Cited hereafter as "Mahmud Ali, Page #."; Dennis Kux. *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991*. DIANE Publishing, 1992. Page 56. Cited hereafter as "Kux, *India and the United States*, Page #."

[165] M Srinivas Chary. *The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward India Since Independence*. Greenwood Press, 1995. Page vii.; Kux, *India and the United States*, Page 56.

India and Pakistan developed specific foreign policies and national identities in the context of the Cold War and aftermath of the Partition, specifically in regard to the disputed territory of Kashmir. Statesmen of both states had different visions for the world, and played different roles in global politics. The Partition played a critical role in shaping foreign policy, especially in the direct aftermath and scramble for order following the violent chaos of the event. Beyond statesmen, the common Indian and Pakistani statesmen held mixed views on the Indo-Pakistani rivalry that had developed post-Partition. Some survivors, such as Syed Babar Ali, viewed the rivalry grimly, and contended that friendly relations could only be established if India and Pakistan adopted "the right attitude" towards each other.[166] Some, such as Shobha Nehru, hold not only negative views of Indo-Pakistani relations post-Partition, but further stated that they still fail to see any necessity for the Partition at all.[167] Some, still, such as Shaharyar Khan, blame the Partition and the subsequent hostility between Indians and Pakistanis all on the British, for coming to India at all.[168]

[166] Oral history with Syed Babar Ali. *Oral History with Syed Babar Ali*. The 1947 Partition Archive, June 29, 2015.
[167] Shobha Nehru, 2013.
[168] Shaharyar Khan, 2016.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Days after the Partition, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, an Urdu poet, wrote the poem "Subh-e-Azadi," or "Dawn of Independence," a direct, anguished reflection of the costs Indians paid for freedom from the British, stating "this isn't surely the dawn with whose desire cradled in our hearts / we had set out."[169] For the seventy-first anniversary of the Partition, several writers were invited to write pieces in remembrance and reflection of the Partition. One poet, Abeeba Talukder, wrote, "the dawn / had been bitten by moths, / flying in droves, in madness / towards light."[170] These two poems echo each other directly and deliver a similar sentiment: the Partition and the violent chaos of it all was not what Indians had expected or wanted when they demanded freedom. The dawn they awoke to held not the sweet promises of independence, but the bitter, blood-stained result of angry political in-fighting, neglect, and final abandonment.

This project addressed questions surrounding the Partition, especially those concerning the immediate internal socio-cultural effects, as well as the external international implications. It is critical to analyze what had occurred through the eyes of those who witnessed and survived the Partition because, simply, the perspectives revealed in the account of a politician reflecting the Partition are drastically different from someone

[169] Subh-e-Azadi, 2017

[170] AAWW. "This Is Not the Dawn: Poetry of Partition." Asian American Writers' Workshop. AAWW, August 14, 2018. Cited hereafter as "AAWW, 2018."

who was a child when the event occurred and saw their families butchered before them. The former is more likely to think about the event in terms of politics and power, and the latter is more likely to focus on the loved ones they saw murdered. Using oral histories to reexamine the Partition allow for deeper and more nuanced understanding of what the *human* costs were of the Partition, and how the decisions made by statesmen had such dramatic, deadly implications for the people.

The oral interviews that were used in this project have yet to star in and be given primary focus in other historical analyses of the Partition. Historians have relied too little on oral histories and memoirs of common citizen and more on political documents to shape and guide their understanding of the Partition. Especially in regard to society and the people in it, the pain of the Partition must be understood through the words and images remembered by its survivors in order to be genuinely grasped. It is through people that the true human cost of the Partition, of decisions made by leaders and policy makers with power and specific agendas, becomes clear. These histories shed light onto how the legacy of the Partition remains so painful, persistent and relevant even after seventy-two years because so many post-Partition problems – Hindu-Muslim tensions, Kashmir, the refugee crisis to a certain degree – were never resolved. The subjects of these oral histories witnessed these problems formulate and fester over that time span, and their perspective and own interpretation of the Partition in turn provides context for current issues in South Asian society, culture, and politics.

Faiz ended his poem with the refrain of "let's go on, we haven't reached the destination yet," a plea for the people to keep going amidst the uncertainty of it all.[171]

[171] Subh-e-Azadi, 2017; AAWW, 2018.

Contemporary poet Sreshtha Sen directly echoes this sentiment, saying, “Come, let’s go, we have not yet reached our destination.”[172] Both poems repeat similar visions of the Partition as one, a small step towards freedom and greatness, referring to the Partition as something horrific but capable of moving on from.

[172] Ibid.

REFERENCES

Primary Sources

Unpublished Sources

From Amritsar's Partition Museum

——— Amol Swani. *Amol Swani*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018.

——— Asha Gupta. *Asha Gupta*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018.

——— Baljit Gandhi. *Baljit Gandhi*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, June 27, 2018.

——— Chhote Lal Bharany. *Chhote Lal Bharany*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 6, 2018.

——— Chugnamal Palomal Kukreja. *Chugnamal Palomal Kukreja*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Dilip Kumar Kanungo. *Dilip Kumar Kanungo*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Hamida. *Hamida*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 15, 2018.

——— Hasina Bewa. *Hasina Bewa*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Ijaz Khan. *Ijaz Khan*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018.

——— Ila Banerjee. *Ila Banerjee*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018.

——— Iqbal Singh. *Iqbal Singh*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, October 29, 2018.

——— Kuldip Nayar. *Kuldip Nayar*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Minna Kapoor. *Minna Kapoor*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Nand Lal Jain. *Nand Lal Jain*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 6, 2018.

——— Nirmal Bakshi. *Nirmal Bakshi*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 8, 2018.

——— Padam Rosha. *Padam Rosha*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Pushpinder Singh Chopra. *Pushpinder Singh Chopra*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, May 2, 2019.

——— Sahib Singh Virdi. *Sahib Singh Virdi*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018.

——— Sudershna Kumari. *Sudershna Kumari*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, March 14, 2018.

——— Surinder Singh Gandhi. *Surinder Singh Gandhi*. The Partition Museum, Amritsar, June 27, 2018.

From the 1947 Partition Archive

——— Oral history with Ajit Cour. *Oral History with Ajit Cour*. The 1947 Partition Archive, November 2, 2010.

——— Oral history with Ali Shan. *Oral History with Ali Shan*. The 1947 Partition Archive, August 21, 2011.

——— Oral history with Anshu Sur. *Oral History with Anshu Sur*. The 1947 Partition Archive, December 6, 2014.

——— Oral history with Baljit Dhillon Vikram Singh. *Oral History with Baljit Dhillon Vikram Singh*. The 1947 Partition Archive, January 1, 2016.

——— Oral history with Bapsi Sidhwa. *Oral History with Bapsi Sidhwa*. The 1947 Partition Archive, April 7, 2013.

——— Oral history with Birinder Pal Singh Cheema. *Oral History with Birinder Pal Singh Cheema*. The 1947 Partition Archive, October 4, 2015.

——— Oral history with Brigadier Dewan Chand Duggal. *Oral History with Brigadier Dewan Chand Duggal*. The 1947 Partition Archive, August 20, 2011.

——— Oral history with Jaya Mehta. *Oral History with Jaya Mehta*. The 1947 Partition Archive, December 16, 2015.

——— Oral history with Khalida Ghousia Akhtar. *Oral History with Khalida Ghousia Akhtar*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 25, 2016.

——— Oral history with Mai Taji. *Oral History with Mai Taji*. The 1947 Partition Archive, January 16, 2016.

——— Oral history with Manika Banerjee. *Oral History with Manika Banerjee*. The 1947 Partition Archive, July 25, 2016.

——— Oral history with Maryam Babar. *Oral History with Maryam Babar*. The 1947 Partition Archive, November 18, 2018.

——— Oral history with Milkha Singh. *Oral History with Milkha Singh*. The 1947 Partition Archive, May 27, 2014.

——— Oral history with Muhammad Saleem. *Oral History with Muhammad Saleem*. The 1947 Partition Archive, December 9, 2016.

——— Oral history with Muhammad Yousuf. *Oral History with Muhammad Yousuf*. The 1947 Partition Archive, May 12, 2016.

——— Oral history with Naseem Mirza Changezi. *Oral History with Naseem Mirza Changezi*. The 1947 Partition Archive, October 23, 2016.

——— Oral history with Nirmala Dandekar. *Oral History with Nirmala Dandekar*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 15, 2016.

——— Oral history with Ravinder Kumar Chopra. *Oral History with Ravinder Kumar Chopra*. The 1947 Partition Archive, April 2, 2011.

——— Oral history with Roshini Rustomji. *Oral History with Roshini Rustomji*. The 1947 Partition Archive, August 19, 2012.

——— Oral history with Salima Hashimi. *Oral History with Salima Hashimi*. The 1947 Partition Archive, January 18, 2016.

——— Oral history with Sardar Tarlochan Singh. *Oral History with Sardar Tarlochan Singh*. The 1947 Partition Archive, January 15, 2012.

——— Oral history with Shaharyar Khan. *Oral History with Shaharyar Khan*. The 1947 Partition Archive, May 31, 2016.

——— Oral history with Sher Singh Kukkal. *Oral History with Sher Singh Kukkal*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 6, 2014.

——— Oral history with Shobha Nehru. *Oral History with Shobha Nehru*. The 1947 Partition Archive, September 24, 2013.

——— Oral history with Suri Sehgal. *Oral History with Suri Sehgal*. The 1947 Partition Archive, October 23, 2016.

——— Oral history with Sushiri Motial. *Oral History with Sushiri Motial*. The 1947 Partition Archive, November 13, 2013.

——— Oral history with Syed Babar Ali. *Oral History with Syed Babar Ali*. The 1947 Partition Archive, June 29, 2015.

——— Oral history with Syed Nizam Shah. *Oral History with Syed Nizam Shah*. The 1947 Partition Archive, March 3, 2016.

——— Oral history with Taj Begum. *Oral History with Taj Begum*. The 1947 Partition Archive, February 6, 2017.

——— Oral history with Vilayat Khan. *Oral History with Vilayat Khan*. The 1947 Partition Archive, April 28, 2013.

——— Oral history with Yogesh Munjal. *Oral History with Yogesh Munjal*. The 1947 Partition Archive, September 10, 2016.

——— Oral history with Zeba Rizvi. *Oral History with Zeba Rizvi*. The 1947 Partition Archive, December 17, 2015.

Goulatia, Bimla. "A Child's Horrifying Memories of India's Partition." India of the Past: Preserving memories of India and Indians. India Of the Past, 2012.

My Family, Partition and Me: India 1947. *My Family, Partition and Me: India 1947*. BBC, August 9, 2017.

Digital Sources

Blogs

——— AAWW. "This Is Not the Dawn: Poetry of Partition." Asian American Writers' Workshop. AAWW, August 14, 2018.

——— Khasru, B Z. "Hindus-Muslim Clash 72 Years after Britain Left India." History News Network. The George Washington University, September 8, 2019.

——— The Penguin India Blog. "Subh-e-Azadi, An Anguished Evocation of the Pain of Partition." The Penguin Digest. Penguin Random House, August 14, 2017.

Videos

——— Vox. "How this border transformed a subcontinent | India & Pakistan." *YouTube* video, 17:20. June 26, 2019.

Websites

——— Brocklehurst, Steven. “Partition of India: 'They Would Have Slaughtered Us'.” BBC News. BBC News, August 12, 2017.

Published Sources

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. *The Myth of Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Bose, Krishna. *Lost Addresses: A Memoir of India 1934-1955*. Niyogi Books, 2015.

Gupta, Narayani, and Sarmistha Dutta Gupta, eds. *A Fighting Spirit: Selected Writings of Ashoka Gupta*. Niyogi Books, 2012.

Jinnah, Mahomed Ali. *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*. Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1960.

Nanda, Bal Ram. *Witness to Partition: A Memoir*. Rupa & Company, 1948.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. *A Bunch of Old Letters: Being Mostly Written to Jawaharlal Nehru and Some Written by Him*. Asia Publishing House, 1958.

Talbot, Phillip. *An American Witness to India's Partition*. SAGE Publications India, 2007.

Yousaf, Nasim. *Mahatma Gandhi and My Grandfather, Allama Mashriqi*. AMZ Publications, 2013.

Secondary Sources

Books

Ali, Chaudhry Muhammad. *The Emergence of Pakistan*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1967.

Ali, S Mahmud. *Cold War in the High Himalayas: The USA, China and South Asia in the 1950s*. Routledge, 1999.

Arnold, David. "Vagrant India: Famine, Poverty, and Welfare under Colonial Rule." In *Cast Out: Vagrancy and Homelessness in Global and Historical Perspective*, edited by Beier A. L. and Ocobock Paul, 117-39. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2008.

Brands, H W. *India and the United States: The Cold Peace*. Twayne Publishers, 1990.

Brines, Russell. *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict*. Pall Mall Press, 1968.

Burke, Samuel Martin. *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1975.

Chary, M Srinivas. *The Eagle and the Peacock: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward India Since Independence*. Greenwood Press, 1995.

Collins, Larry, and Dominique Lapierre. *Freedom at Midnight*. Vikas Publishing House, 1975.

Das, Manmath Nath. *Partition and Independence of India: Inside Story of the Mountbatten Days*. Vision Books, 1982.

Hansen, Anders Bjørn. *Partition and Genocide Manifestation of Violence in Punjab: 1937-1947*. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. *A History of Pakistan and Its Origins*. Anthem Press, 2004.

Jalal, Ayesha. *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008.

Khan, Shaheen Irshad. *Rejection Alliance?: A Case-Study of U.S.-Pakistan Relations, 1947-1967*. American University of Beirut, 1972.

Khan, Yasmin. *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007.

Kux, Dennis. *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991*. DIANE Publishing, 1992.

McMahon, Robert J. *The Cold War on the Periphery*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Rathod, Bhujendra Singh L R. "Women in Partition: A Feminist Reading." In *Reminiscences of Partition*, 215–63. Shimoga: Kuvempu University, 2010.

Rotter, Andrew Jon. *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964*. Cornell University Press, 2000.

Singh, Anita Inder. *The Limits of British Influence: South Asia and the Anglo-American Relationship 1947–1956*. Pinter Publishers, 1993.

Talbot, Ian, and Gurharpal Singh. *The Partition of India*. Vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Tharoor, Shashi. *Nehru: The Invention of India*. Penguin Random House India Private Limited, 2018.

Venkataramani, M S. *The American Role in Pakistan, 1947 to 1958*. Radiant Publishers, 1982.

Articles

Ahmad, Qazi Shakil. "The Partition Plan, Indian Design and the Kashmir Issue." *Pakistan Horizon* 56, no. 2 (2003): 17-35.

Ahmar, Moonis. "The Politics of Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia." *Pakistan Horizon* 35, no. 3 (1982): 44-59.

Ali, Rabia Umar. "Muslim Women and the Partition of India: A Historiographical Silence." *Islamic Studies* 48, no. 3 (2009): 425-36.

Chatterji, Joya. "The Fashioning of a Frontier: The Radcliffe Line and Bengal's Border Landscape, 1947-52." *Modern Asian Studies* 33, no. 1 (1999): 185-242.

Dey, Arunima. “Violence Against Women During the Partition of India: Interpreting Women and Their Bodies in the Context of Ethnic Genocide.” *Spanish Journal of English Studies*, no. 37 (2016).

Ghosh, Gautam. ""God Is A Refugee": Nationality, Morality and History in the 1947 Partition of India." *Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice* 42, no. 1 (1998): 33-62.

Jafri, Hira Batool. "Female Falcons: An Exploration of Feminine Honor in South Asian Communities." 2014. Masters Theses. 64.

Mansoor, Nasreen. “The Concept of Honor and Shame for South Asian British Muslim Men and Women.” In *Therapy, Culture and Spirituality*, 56–69. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

Mukherjee, Anuparna. "Reading Women's Journey through the Debris of Indian Partition in the “Charnel Ground of History”." *Rocky Mountain Review* 66 (2012): 93-105.

Tinker, Hugh. "Pressure, Persuasion, Decision: Factors in the Partition of the Punjab, August 1947." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 36, no. 4 (1977): 695-704.

Virdee, Pippa. "Remembering Partition: Women, Oral Histories and the Partition of 1947." *Oral History* 41, no. 2 (2013): 49-62.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

Basmah Arshad is currently a junior, double majoring in History and Political Science and minoring in Chinese language and culture at the University of Texas at Arlington. She is interested in researching historical and contemporary issues in South Asia, especially those relating to ethnic or religious conflict. Arshad intends to pursue a career in law or education following graduation in Spring 2021.